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HONORABLE RENAE J. HOFF, Presiding 
Jon M. Steele and Karl J. Runft, RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC, 
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400, Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Susan E. Bmton and Tammy A. Zoltan, MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, 
CHARTERED, 950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520, Boise, ID 83702 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
1 





SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) 
INC.; and DOES I through V. .. 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
Before the Court are: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Bart and Alane McKnight 
Individually, filed on October 4,2006; 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 29,2006; 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability, filed on August 22, 
ORDER - 1 
4. Defendant Bart and Alane McKnight's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, 
filed on September 19,2006; 
and, the Court having reviewed the relevant pleadings, briefs and memoranda, and having 
considered oral argument, and good cause appearing therefore: 
It is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied; 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial: 
a. Count Two - Tortious Interference with Purchase and Sale Agreement; 
b. Count Three - Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; 
c. Count Four - Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; 
3. Defe~ldant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial: Count One - Breach of Contract; 
4. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; 
5. Defendant McKnights' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees is staved until the 
final conclusion and decision in this case; 
6. The filing of all further requests for attorney fees and costs shall also be staved until 
the final conclusion and decision in this case; and 
It is further ORDERED that Counts Two, Three, and Four of Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Demand for a Jury Trial against Defendant, are hereby dismissed with prejudice, with costs and 
attorneys fees to be addressed separately at the final conclusion of this case. 
ORDER - 2 
b i )  
DATED this -day of November, 2006. NOV - 7 'CC6 
By: 
I ORDER - 3 
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 day of November, 2006, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Jon M. Steele U.S. Mail 
Karl J. F. Runft -Hand Delivery 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 - Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com 
T m y  A. Zokan 5 U.S. Mail 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE ___ Hand Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 - Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702  Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 331 -1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
ORDER - 4 
SUSAN E. BUXTON, ISB #4041 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN, ISB # 5450 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1 800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
CANYON COUNTY CL.ERM 
B MERCAOO, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
1 
v. ) AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY A. ZOKAN 
) IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
INC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I ) JUDGMENT 
through V. 1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
)SS. 
County of Ada 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt in the above- 
entitled matter and make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum Decision 
on Judicial Review and Order by the Honorable James C. Morfitt, District Judge, in Goodman Oil 
Company v. City of Narnpa, Case No. CV-04-10007 (November 7, 2006), that I received from 
AFFIDAVIT OF TAN~MY A. ZOKAN - 1 6)0@154 - - . -  
Plaintiffs counsel via fax on November 29,2006. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
&#day of December, 2006. SUBSCRLBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
Residing at: mob id 
My Commission ~ k ~ i r e s :  3- - [a- 
AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY A. ZOKAN - 2 800%55 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this db%j ofDecember, 2006,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY A. ZOKAN by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to th; following: 
John M. Steele U.S. Mail 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC Hand Delivery 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 ___ Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY A. ZOKAN - 3 04;)OP56 
John L. Runft, E B  # 1059 Jon M. Staete, ISB # 1911 Karl J. P. R d ,  ISB # 6640 Mark L. Means, ISB # 7530 
Phone: (208) 333.8506 Phone: W) 33394% Phone: (208) 333-14G3 Phone: (208) 333.14W3 
$mnfta?mftlaw.com jmstcd&2NnftlowWnrm klmt!@indtlaw.com !!$~s~E&w~~!ux~ 
TO: Tammy Zokan FAXNUMBER: 331-1202 
FROM: Karissa ArmbrusS, Paralegal 
DATE 11-29-06 
SUBJECT: Goodman. v. City of Nampa 
NO. 
PAGES: 
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL OF T!3E PAGES, PLEASE CALL BACK 
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AT THE FOLLOWING NUMBER (208) 333-8506 
Dear Txmmy : 
Per our conversation this morning, attached is a copy of the Memorandum 
Decision on Judicial Review and Order in the above case. 
Sincerely, 
Karissa Armbrust, Paralegal 
Tha documents acmmpanying this facsimile transmission contain informaion which may be confid&tial or 
privileged and exempt fmm disclosure under applicable law. The information is intended to be for the use of 
the individual or entity named on this transmission sheet. If you art not thc intended recipient, be aware that 
any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of thc contents of this information is without a u ~ ~ o n  and is 
prohibited. If you have rcceived this facsimile in enor, please notie us by collect tolephona immediately so 
that we canamge for the rnrieval of the ariginal documentsat no cost to you. 
The Alaska Center * 1020 W. Main Street. 6uik 400 * Boise, ID 83702 
Famimile (208) 343-3246 
www.n~n[tlaw.co~n 
4 00015Y. 
F I L E D  
-.M+PM. 
NOV 0 7 2M16 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUPl 
IN W E  DISTRICT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATJ5 OF DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 








CITY OF N M A ,  a corporate 1 MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
Body politic; THE CITY COUNCIL of the ) JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ORDER 
CITY OF NAMPA; MAYOR TOM DALE, ) 
in his capacity as Mayor ofthe City of ) 
Namua: and DIANA LAMBMG, in her ) 
cap;ci& as City Clerk; 
Respondents. 
Petitioner G.oodman Oil Company ("Goodman Oil") seeks judicial review of the easement 
,' 
reserved in City of Nampa Ordhmce No. 3374, which vacates 1" Avenue South between 2"d 
Street South and 3n' Street South in the City of Nampa. The ordinance reserves "the westerly fiAy 
feet (50') for an Ingress/Egress and utility easement." 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ORDER -1 
636B0%58 
. . 
The matter came on regularly before the Court for oral argument on Sqtember 1, 2006. 
Petitioner Goodman Oil Company appeared through its attorney of record, Mr. Jon M. Steele. 
Respondent City of Nampa ("City") appeared through its attorney of record, Mr. John R. 
Kormanik 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL WLSTORY 
Goodman Oil first petitioned the City of Nampa to vacate the relevant potion of 1" 
Avenue South on or about August 3,1995. By letter dated September 6, 1995, Norman L. Holm 
the Planning Director for the City of Nampa advised Goodman Oil that the street vacation would 
be complcte so long as the Nampa Fire Department approved fire apparatus access. Subsequently, 
the first reading of the ordinance occurred September 18, 1995. The second reading occuned on 
October 2, 1995. On October 16, 1995, the Ordinance was tabled because "approval of the fiee 
access by the Fire Department.. .was never provided." 
In August, 2004, Goodman Oil sought to complete the street vacation. On or about August 
4, 2004, Fire Prevention Oflcer Brent Hoskins sent a letter to the Planning and Cornunity 
Development Department advising that 
Nampa Fire Department wiU agree to the vacation of 1' AVE S, 
provided a dedicated 20' wide apparatus access road is  maintained 
between 2" ST S and 3' ST S. The apparatus access road shill be 
built within rhe conhes of the vacated. rieht of way Sics. All 
affected parcel owners shall respond in writing to the Narnpa Fire 
Department that they understand the requirements of this letter. Any 
deviations from the requirements above shall fust be approved by 
the Nampa Fire Department. (Emphasis added). 
On August 16,2004, the City Council took up the street vacation. There was a motion for 
suspension of the mles requiring three readings. The motion carried and Otdinance No. 3374 
vacating the relevant portion of  I*' Avenue South was passed. After it was passed, approved by the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ORDBR -2 
- 000959 
Mayor and released for publication, but prior to publication, the City recalled the Ordinance and 
the Mayor vetoed it. 
Petitioner Goodman Oil Company brought this action on October 5, 2004, as an 
Application for Writ of .Mandate and a Petition for Judicial Review. Goodman Oil. sought 1) a writ 
of mandate to require the City of Nampa to publish an Ordinance vacating a portion of 1' Avenue 
South passed by the City Council, approved by and thereafter vetoed by the Mayor of the City of 
Nampa; and, 2) judicial review of the Nampa City Council's decision to reserve a fifty (50') foot 
ingresdegress and utility easement over the westerly portion of the vacated portion of 1'' Avenue 
South. 
On August 8,2005, this Court granted Goodman Oil's Writ of Mandamus and directed the 
Respondent, City of Nampa, to publish Ordinance No. 3374, which, in relevant part, reads:' 
Section 1: That 1' Avenue South between 2* Street South and 
3rd Street South in the City of Nampa, Idaho be and the same is 
hereby vacated, such vacation subject .to the following described 
access and utility easement which is hereby reserved on the vacated 
prouertv, to-wk 
See Exhibit A attache4 hereto and, by this reference, incorporated 
herein as if set forth in WI. (Emphasis added). 
Exhibit A, describing the reserved easement, states the following: 
Maintaining the westerly fifty feet (50') for an IngresslEgress and 
utility easement. 
On September 23, 2005, thc City of Nampa filed a notice of compliance with the 
preemptory writ of mandate. 
Pursuant to the Coutt's Order Requiring Preparation of Record and Transcripts and 
Appellate Scheduling Order, dated Octobcr 27, 2004, the Agency Record and Transcripts were 
filed on November 7, 2005. The Petitioner's brief was due within thirty-five (35) days ofthe date 
I A copy o f  Ordinance No. 3374 ia attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
MEMORANDUM DECXSlON ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ORDER -3 
of notice that the transcripts and the agency record have been filed. Goodman Oil's appellate brief 
was due December 12,2005. 
Instead of filing an appellate brief, Petitioner Goodman Oil, on December 1, 2005, moved 
for summary judgment on the judicial review. The City of Nampa opposed the motion. Both 
Goodman Oil and the City of Nmpa moved to augment the record. On April 3, 2006, the Court 
entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on Petitioner's Renewed Motion to Augment Record 
denying both parries motions to augment the record. Additionally, the Court granted the City of 
Nampa cxtended time in wkich to respond to Goodman Oil's motion for suxnrnary judgment. The 
Court ordered the parties to "proceed to file .briefing in this matter in accord with the Court's prior 
scheduling order." See Order Granting Respondents' Motion for Extension of Time and Motion to 
Shorten Time, dated March 31,  2006 and filed April 3, 2006. On April 1.1, 2006, The City of 
Nampa fled its Motion to Dismiss Appellate Proceeding. 
On May 8, 2006, Petitioner Goodman Oil filed Petitioner's Opening Appellant Brief. On 
June 5,2006, the City filed its Response Brief. On June 22,2006, the Petitioner filed its Reply 
Brief. Respondent's Petition for Judicial Review was thereafter noticed for oral arguments. 
Following oral argument, the Court denied the City's Motion to Dismiss Appellate Proceeding. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON JUDICIAL mww 
Whether the City of Nampa exceeded its statutory authority in 
granting an application to vacate a street by reserving a fitly foot 
(50') ingress/egress and utility easement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has previously held that the Idaho Adminisirative Procedure Act ("IAPG") does 
not govern this action as stated in the Court's Memorandum Dechion and Ordor on Petitioner's 
Renewed Motion to Augment Record, filed April 3,2006. In its briefing and at oral argument, the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ORDER -4 
City requested that this Court revisit that issue. Both patties presented argument and authority on 
the applicability of the IAPA. 
The IAPA and its judicial review standards apply to agency actions. 
"Agency" means each state board, commission, department or 
officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested 
cases, but does not include the legislative or judicial branches, 
executive officers listed in section I, article TV, of the constitution 
of the state O% Idaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and 
exclusively from the constitution. the state militia or the state 
board of correction. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that "[tlhe language of the IGPA indicates that it is 
intended to govern the judicial review of decisions made by state administrative agencies, and 
not local_e;ovemine bodies." Idaho Historic Preservation Council v. City Council of Boise, 134 
Idaho 651, 653 (2000) (Italics in original) (Underlining added); see Gibson v, Ada Counfy 
Sheriffs Department, 139 Idaho 5 (2003). Counties and city governments are considered local 
governing bodies rather than agencies for purposes of the M A .  Gibson at 7 .  Absent a statute 
invoking the IAPA's judicial review provisions, local government actions may not be reviewed 
under the IAPA. Id. at 7-8. 
Statutes may authorize judicial review without invoking the provisions of the IAPA. Id. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(a)(l) provides: 
The procedures and standards of review applicable to judicial 
review of state agency and local government actions shall be as 
provided by statute. When iudicial review of an action ~f a state 
agency or local ~overnment is  exwresslv orovided bv statute but no 
stated procedure or standard of review is wrovided in that statute, 
then Rule 84 orovides fie orocedure for the district Court's judicial 
review. Actions of state agencies or officers or actions of a local 
government, its officers or its units are not subject to judicial 
review unless expressly authorized by statute. (Emphasis added). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
m I C I h L  REVIEW AND ORDBR -5 
In this case, judicial review of an order granting or denying ao application to vacate a 
street is expressly provided by statute. 
Whenever the governing body shall grant the application, or r e h e  
the application of any person or persons, made as provided for the 
vacation of any.. . street.. . g. aDDeal may be taken from anv act, 
order or oroceedine: of the board made or had aursuant to by any 
person agmieved thereby within twenty (20) days &er the first 
publication or posting of the statement as required by section 31- 
819, Idaho Code. Procedure upon such appeal shall be in all 
m c t s  the same as  res scribed in sections 3 1-1 5 10. 3 1-1 5 11 and 
3 1-15 15. Idaho Code. (Emphasis added). 
I ~ ~ l . 1 0  CODE 5 50-1322 (2006). 
Idaho Code Section 50-1322, which pruvides for an appeal from an order granting or 
denying an application to vacate a street, is a provision of chapter 13 (Plats and Vacations), title 
50 (Municipal Corporations), Idaho Code. Idaho Code Section 50-1322 facially provides a 
procedure for the judicial review of street vacation decisions. However, Idaho Code Sections 3 1- 
1510 and 3 1-151 1 were repealed in 1993 and Idaho Code Section 31-151 5 was repealed in 1995. 
A1 three of the repeated Idaho Code Sections referenced in LC. S, 50-1322,were found in title 31, 
Countjes and County Law. Idaho Code Section 3 1-1510, prior to its repeal in 1993, provided for 
notice of the appeal, the time for the hearing of the appeal and the requirements for a bond. 
Idaho Section 31-1511, prior to its repeal in 1993, provided for the transmission of papers 
relating to the appeal to the district judge. Idaho Code Section 3 1-1 51 5 required that no member 
of the board of commissioners could have any interest in property sold or purchased by the 
county or in any contract of the county. For the current law on that subject, see I. C. § 31-807A. 
All three of the repealed statutes cited in LC. S) 50-1322 predated the enactment of either 
the IAPA in 1967 or the adoption of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. None of these 
referenced statutes invoke the IAPA's judicial review provisions. Neither do any of the 
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referenced statutes set forth a standard of review applicable to the review of street vacation 
decisions by a city. 
The conclusion that the three repealed statutes referenced in I.C, $ 50-1322 did not 
invoke the IAPA's judicial review provisions is further buttressed by the Statement of Purpose 
for the bill which repealed those code sections, which stated: 
The purpose of this bill i s  to provide for the appeal of county 
commission decisions in the same manner as judicial review of 
actions under the Administrative Procedure Act (AM), chapter 52, 
title 67, Idaho Code. 
The current process for appeals is archaic and inconsistent with 
other sections of county law. The p l h g  and 7aning and 
medical indigency appeals are conducted as appeals under the 
APA. 
The current process of appellate procedure makes the district judge 
the fourth or "super" commissioner with the ability to overrule the 
factual determinations and judgments of three individuals. 
The types of decisions that are appealcd are administrative or 
executive in nature and the more appropriate method would be to 
use the MA. This method of appeal will protect the rights of 
those affected by county commission decisions while giving 
consideration to county commission judgments. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 02035,1993 House Bill 120. 
The 1993 House Bill also added a new section to Title 3 1, Idaho Code. Section 3 1-1509 
was added to provide the manner of judicial review of actions by boards of county 
commissioners. The new section 3 1-1 509 provided: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act, 
order or proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person 
aggrieved thereby within thc same time and in the same manner as 
provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of 
actions. 
(2) Venue for judicial review of board actions shall. be in the 
district court of the county governed by the board. 
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1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 103. In 1995, Idaho Code section 31-1509 was redesignated Idaho 
Code section 3 1-1 506. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 61 8 11. 
Therefore, the Court finds and concludes that LC. (j 50-1322 does not invoke IAPA's 
judicial review provisions. 
The Cowt h t h e r  finds and concludes, as previously announced, that the judicial review 
provisions of the MPA are not applicable to these proceedings. 
The Court recognizes that the 1993 Idaho legislature created an anomaly by also enacting 
Idaho Code Section 40-208 governing the judicial review of final decisions of a board of county 
or highway district commissioners relating to abandonment or vacation of a highway. Although 
I.C. 8 40-208 does not specifically invoke the judicial review provisions of the IAPA, the statute 
does adopt standards of review similar to those ofthe IAPA. 
Idaha Rule of Civil Procedure 84, wbjch governs judicial review of local governing 
bodies, does not provide a specific stan.dard of review. Therefore, the Court applies the general 
standards of review for cases in which the district court reviews appeals from the magistrate 
court. See Idaho Hi,~torical Preservation Council, at 654. 
The Court finds and concludes that judicial review of a decision of a local governing body, 
in the absence of a statutory standard of review, is as provided for w h  the district court reviews a 
dwision of a magistrate judge ss an appellate proceeding not involving a trial de novo. The district 
court shall review the case upon the record and determine the appeal upon the same standards of 
review as an appeal from the district cow% to the Supreme Court under the statutes and laws of this 
state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court. See I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l). 
Factual findings will. not be set aside on judicial review unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Kornfield v. Kornfeld, 134 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 2000). Findings of fact ,wpported by 
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substantial and competent cvidence are not clearly erroneous. Whiteley v. State, 13 1 Idaho 323, 
326 (1998). 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Herman ex rel. Herman v. Herman, 136 Idaho 685,688 (2002). 
ANALYSIS 
In its Petition for Judicial Review, Goodman Oil argues that the easement reswation 
exceeds the City of Nampa's statutory authority, that it is not suppoaed by any evidence found in 
the record, that the reservation violates due p r m ,  and that the reservation is arbitrary and 
capricious, The City of Nampa argues that the easement contained in Odinance 3374 is wholly 
proper and within the City of Nampa's authority. The City further asserts that Goodman Oi is 
judicially estopped Born challenging the easement. 
Vacated Firsf Avenue South is eighty (80') feet in width and three hundred (300') feet in 
length. The easement reserved by the City covers the westerly fifty (50') feet of the vacated 
property thus encumbering all of Cbodman Oil's property located on the west side of the vacated 
Cities are empowered to vacate any street by statute. 
... Provided M e r  that whenever any street . . . shall be vacated, 
the same shall revert to the owner of the adjacent real estate, one- 
half (112) on each side thereof, or as the city council deems in the 
best interests of the adjoining properties, but the ri&t of wav, 
easements and hcchise rights of any lot owner or ~ubl ic  utility 
shall not be imuaired thereby.. .. (Emphasis added). 
IDAHO CODE $50-311 (2006). 
The statute does not provide for the imposition conditions on the vacation. Rather, the 
statute explicitly provides that a street vacation may not impair "right of way, easements and 
franchise rights of any lot owner or public utility." Id. 
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The Idaho suprkme has held that Idaho Code Scction 50-31 1, whioh applies to all 
municipal corporations 431 the state of Idaho and is an act of the state legislature is a state law of 
1 
general application. ~ l a k k  v. Yo~oung, 122 Idaho 302, 308 (1992). In Black, the City of Ketchum 
conditioned the vacatiod ofthe healay upon the issuance of a building permit and the funding of a 
I 
construction loan id. a 1 305. In addition, the vacation ord.inance provided the City of Ketchum 
a right of reversion if a ertificate of occupancy was not issued for a proposed motel. Id. The b 
Supreme Court held: 1 
The two conditions that the City of Ketchum imposed upon 
vacation of the alley, as well as the right of reversion should a 
certificate of occupancy not be issued, are not expressly granted 
powers, fairly implied powers from the oleas language of LC. Ej 50- 
3 11, nor m they powers essential to the vacation of the alley. The 
only condition that I.C. § 50-31 1 allows upon a fmdine of 
ex~edience for the vublic good is that the vacation cannot impair 
"'the right of way, easements and franchise rights of any lot owner 
or public utility." I.C. $ 50-311. Thus, the two above-listed 
conditions, as well as the right of reversion, are ultra vires acts by 
the City of Ketchwn because they conflict with LC. 50-31 1. 
(Italics in original) (Underling added). 
Id. at 308. 
The Court thus finds and concludes, as a matter of law, that the City's reservation of a 50 
-. - 
foot ingresslegress and utility easement is in violation of the provisions of LC. 5 50-31 1. 
-- 
The Court further finds and concludes that the City's resorvation of a 50 foot 
ingresslegress and utility easement is an ultra vircs act by the City because the reservation of the 
easement is in conflict with I. C. $ 50-3 1 1. 
Judicial estoppel is a doctrine which prevents a party from assuming position in one 
proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding. Although the 
issue ofjudicial estoppel was not directly addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Black, in that 
case, Blacks had signed an estoppel &davit which provided that the conditions of the ordin,ance 
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were acceptable to them and would not be challenged by them. Id at 305. In defense of the 
Blacks' complaint, the City of Ketchum asserted the affirmative defense of estoppel. Id The 
trial court subsequently granted the City of Ketchan's motion for summary judgment finding 
that Ketchurn wns within its statutory authority to impose the conditions and the right of 
reversion upon its vacation of the alley in question. The IMso Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment of the district court and remanded the case to the trial court to determine if other 
factors existed or were considered regarding the public expediency requirement of I. C. 5 50- 
311. 
This Court finds and concludes that Goodman Oil is not judicially estopped tiom 
challenging the statutory authority of the City to impose conditions upon the vacation of thr? 
portion of First Avenue South at issue in this case. 
The Court further finds and concludes that, in light of thc above-fmdings, it is not 
necessary to address Goodman Oil's remaining arguments. 
The Court still further finds and concludes that the fmdings set forth in Ordinace No. 
3374 relate only to the procedural history of the request to vacate and the adequacy of the access 
and utility easement. The ordinance contains no findings "of expedience for the public good" 
required by I. C. 5 50-3 1 1. 
Therefore, 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that the reservation of  a 50 food 
ingresslegress and utility easement in Ordinance No. 3374 be, and is hereby, SET ASDE. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, and this does ORDER, that Ordinance No. 3374 be, and is 
hereby, REMAM)ED to the City of Nampa for its determination as to whether other factors 
existed or regarding the public good requirement of I. C. tj 50-3 1 1.  
DATED: NOV 7 2006 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ORDER -13 
-0881?0 
AN ORDINANCe OF THE CITY OF NAMPA, IDAHO, VACPITXNG lS AVENUB 
SOUR3 B E m N  2ND STREET SOUflK 3RD STREET SOUTH IN THE CMY OF 
NAMPA, CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, SUBBCI' TO AN ACCESS AM;, TJTlT.,R'Y 
EASEMJiWT RESERVED Tj%~ON, AM) DIRECIING THE CITY BNGIM?ER TO 
ALTER TEE USE AND AREA MAP ACCORDJNOLY. 
W R E A S ,  on September 5,1995, a public hearing on vacating 1" Avenue 
Sou& between 2@ Street South and 3* Street South in the City of Nampa WBS hold b a k e  the 
City Councjl., and 
WHEREAS, the City Comd approved the vacation; and 
WHWEAS, on September 18, 1995, the F b t  Reading of the Ordinance 
Vacating 1" Avauc Sonth between 2W' Sheet South and 3"' Street South in the City of 
Nampa was read before thc City ComciQ and 
1 WIEJIBM, on October 2, 1995, the Second Reading of the above des& 
i vacation ordinance was read b e b  the City Council; and 
I 
WHEREAS, on Odobes: 16,1995, the l'hird Reading of fhe above described 
vacation &dhance was tabled by the City Council because thc necessary appsoval of fira 
access through the ana by Khc Fire Department had not b m ~  obtainea; and 
WWFlREAS, the Fire Deparlment has recently reviewed devdoprmeat plans for 
the area and has provided i ts  written, conditional approval of the vacation Ordinance if an 
access and utility easement i s  reta.iued through the property to be vacated; and 
I 
WHEREAS, the City of Nampa has created a legal description for in. access 
I and utility easement to be retained through the property to be vacated; and 
WHEREAS, the access and utility easement i s  acceptable to the F h  
Department as to location and dimension. 
NOW, THBRFFORB, BE IT ORDAXNED BY MAYOR BM) 
COTJNCTL OF THE C5I7E OF NAMPA, JDAHO: 
Section 1: That lST Avenue Sourh between 2ND S w t  Sourh aad 3RD Street 
South in the City of Nampa, Idaho be and the same is hereby vacared, such vacation subject 
to the following desdbed access and atility easement which i s  hereby resew& on the 
vacated prop*, to-wit: 
See Exhibit A attached hereto and, by this reference, incorporated 
harein as if set foah in full. 
000%7% EXHIBIT , 4 A tt  
Section 2: That thE City Bngbew i s  heteby instructed and directed to alter 
the Use aad h a  Map in accordance with the above Onihance. 
PASSED BY TWE COUNCIL OF THE CI'IY OF NAMPA, ID-0, THIS - I DAY OF 
humlnt:. 2004.. 
APPROVED BY THE MAYOR OF THE UTY OF NAZMPA, IDIUHO, 2131~~61th RAY 
OF ~uqust:  ,2004. 
Approved: 

LEGAL DESCRIPTION FOR 
VACATION OF FLRST AVXNUE SOUTH 
That portion of First Avenue South between Second Street South and Third Street South 
wi th  the NW "/*, Section 22, and the NE 5/c Section 21, Township 3 North, w e  2 
West, Boise Meridian, City ofNanpa, Canyon C o w ,  Idaho, as shown on th pbt of 
P L E A S M S  ADDITION on tile with Canyon Couaty Book 4, Page 10. 
Maintaining rhe westerly Etty feet (50') for an Ingrdgress and utility easement. 

I, Mayar Tom Dale do hereby Ordinance number 3374 fox Vacation of l* venue 
South between 2A Street South and 3" Sttcct South pursuant to Nampa City Code 2-2-3- 
oining property owner. 
Mayor 
City of Nampa 
'SUSAN E. BUXTON, ISB #4041 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 420 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1- 1800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1 202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
~c 2 6 2006 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
B MERCADQ. DEPUW 
Attorneys for Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
1 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
) 
v. 1 
) M E M O R A N D U M  IN SUPPORT O F  
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) DEFENDANT'S SECOND M O T I O N  






COMES NOW, Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. ("Duro-Bilt" or "Defendant"), 
by an through its attorneys of record, Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submits its 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 
26,2006, on the remaining issue in this case: Count 1 of Plailltiff s Complaint - Breach of Contract. 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 3 1,1995, Plaintiff, Duro-Bilt, the Blamires Family Trust and T.J. Forest, Inc. entered 
into a Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (the "1995 Agreement" or "Vacation 
Agreement"), whereby the parties to the 1995 Agreement agreed to the City ofNampa's vacation of 
First Avenue South between Blocks 16 and 19 ofPleasants Addition and the execution of subsequent 
agreements upon the happening of the following conditions: 
1 .  City action approving the vacation of 1" Ave. S; 
2. The parties granting a perpetual easement on the vacated property among 
themselves for access to and from each party's property, which access is to be at the discretion of 
property owners; 
3. The parties executing an agreement defining their rights and obligations after the 
City vacated the street; 
4. The parties sharing of maintenance of the vacated property in proportion to the 
amount of property they each own. 
Complaint, Ex. A, 77 1-3. 
No ordinance related to the vacation was adopted in 1995 or anytime thereafterprior to 2004. 
The vacation did not come up again until Mr. Ralph Wylie sought to purchase Plaintiff s property in 
2004. Plf 000203-206. On August 4, 2004, the Nampa Fire Department issued a letter stating its 
terms of agreement regarding the vacation. Plf 000046. The requirements included: (1) a twenty 
foot (20') access easement, and (2) written approval of the Nampa Fire Department's access 
requirement by all affected property owners. Id. The 20' access did not exist as a condition to 
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vacation prior to August 4,2004, hence the Fire Department's requirement for owner approval. See 
Id., Plf 000046. 
In the summer of 2004, Mr. Wylie approached Duro-Bilt and asked that it sign a new 
agreement signifying its agreement to the Nampa Fire Department's August 4, 2004, 20' access 
requirement. See Plf 000233,000250; Affidavit of Chns E. Yorgason in Support of Defendant's 
Motions filed on June 16,2006 (hereinafter "Yorgason Aff."), Ex. B (Conley Tr.) pp. 47-51, Ex. 6. 
After review, Duro-Bilt refused to sign the document because the 20' easement did not provide 
adequate access to Duro-Bilt's property and would injure Duro-Bilt's business. Plf 000250-251, 
253; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 45,l. 25,p. 46,ll. 1-7; p. 85,ll. 24-25, p. 86,ll. 1-14, 
p. 90,ll. 11-25, p. 91,ll. 1-22. 
Despite Duro-Bilt's refusal to agree to the limited 20' access proposed by the Fire 
Department, Mr. Wylie proceeded with the vacation application and the Nampa City Council 
approved the vacation of First Avenue South by Ordinance No. 3374. Plf 000251; Yorgason Aff., 
Ex. B (Conley Tr.) p. 99,ll. 10-13. Ordinance No. 3374, was adopted by the City Council on August 
16, 2004. Complaint, Ex. C. Ordinance No. 3374 conditions the vacation on a certain fifty-foot 
(50') access and utility easement. Id. Duro-Bilt was not aware that OrdinanceNo. 3374 approviilg 
the vacation was before the City Council nor did Duro-Bilt have any knowledge of the actual 
contents of any such Ordinance until after the Ordinance was adopted on August 16, 2004. Plf 
000213,000253; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 63 1. 10-25, p. 64 1. 1-1 1, p. 87 1. 1-1 I, p. 
88 1. 5-20, p. 89 1. 8-25, p. 90 1. 1-3, p. 100 1.2-24. 
After learning that the City adopted an ordinance approving the vacation, Duro-Bilt contacted 
the City to object to the vacation on the basis that 20' would not provide adequate access to 
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Defendant's property. . . . To restrict this street would cripple [Duro-Bilt's] business, frustrate 
customers and become a traffic hazard." Complaint, Ex. D.' Duro-Bilt's concerns were based on 
the 20' easement. 
After the City vetoed the vacation ordinance, the parties began having discussions, with 
Duro-Bilt explaining that it needed no less than a forty feet (40') easement for access to its proprerty. 
See Yorgason Aff. at 7 2. Plaintiff refused to agree to anything more than a twenty-five foot (25') 
access easement along the vacated portion of First Avenue South and the prospective purchaser was 
only willing to give a twenty foot (20') access easement. Id.; see also Exhibits D, E, F & G to the 
Yorgason Affidavit. 
11. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Plaintiffs 2004 Writ of Mandamus/Petition for Judicial Review (before Judge Morfitt) 
On October 5,2004, Plaintiff sued the City and Duro-Bilt seeking a writ of mandamus for 
publication of Ordinance No. 3374 and a petition for judicial review challenging the City's 
reservation of fifty-foot (50') access and utility easement. Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition 
for Judicial Review, Goodman Oil Company v. City of Nampa, et a1 and Scotty's Duro-Bilt 
Generator, Inc., Case No. CV 04-10007. On June 29,2005, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs claims 
against Duro-Bilt with prejudice for the reason that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Duro-Bilt 
upon which relief could be granted. Zokan Aff., Ex. A. The Court also awarded Duro-Bilt costs and 
attorney fees in the amount of $9,332.49. Id., Ex. D. 
After dismissing Plaintiffs claims against Defendant with prejudice, the Court granted 
1 Defendant did not know the Ordinance imposed a 50' access and utility easement rather than 
the proposed 20' access easement. Yorgason Aff. Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 100 1.2-25. 
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1 Plaintiffs request for Preemptory Writ of Mandamus and issued its Order on August 8, 2005, 
compelling the City to publish OrdinanceNo. 3374. Plf 000001-2,000004-5. Ordinance No. 3374 
as adopted and subsequently published in accordance with Court Order, provides for a 50' 
emergency and utility access easement. Plf 00001 1. Judge Morfitt then issued his Memorandum 
Decision on Judicial Review onNovember 7,2006, remanding Ordinance No. 3374 to the City for 
"its determination of as to whether other factors existed or regarding the public good requirement of 
LC. $50-3 11 ." Zokan Aff., Ex. A at p. 12. The referenced factors include a determination of 
whether the rights-of-way, easements and franchise rights of any property owner or public utility 
would be impaired by the vacation. Id. at 9; Idaho Code 8 50-3 1 1. 
B. Plaintiffs 2005 Comvlaint (before Judge HofQ 
On September 19,2005, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial against Duro- 
Bilt and Bart and Alane McKnight individually, alleging breach of contract and various torts. 
Goodman Oil Company v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. et al, Case No. CV 05-9800. 
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs Coinplaint against the McKnights individually, which the 
Court granted by Order entered September 20,2006. (Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of 
the dismissal, which the Court denied by Order entered November 7,2006.) The parties filed cross 
motions for summary judgment, which were resolved by the Court Order entered on November 7, 
2006: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability was denied; Duro-Bilt's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was denied as to Plaintiffs Complaint - Count 1 (Breach of 
Contract) and granted as to Plaintiffs Coinplaint - Counts 2, 3 and 4 (Tortious, Negligent and 
Intentional Interference of Agreement/Economic Advantage). The remaining issue in this case is 
Count 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint - Breach of Contract. 
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111. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
"Summary Judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' "Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 
141 Idaho 233,238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). The Court must "construe the record in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion [for summary judgment], drawing all reasonable 
inferences in that party's favor." Id. '"A] l a 1  court is not limited to a consideration of the pleadings 
in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal 
Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). Other materials "can be used to pierce the formal 
allegations of the pleadings and to show that what appears on the face of the pleadings alone to be a 
genuine issue of fact is in reality not a genuine issue at all." Id. 
Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not genuine, 
or disputes as to matters of fonn do not create genuine issues which will preclude 
summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to create a 
genuine issue as against such affidavits and other evidentiary materials which show 
the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create an 
issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely. A popular formula is that 
summary judgment should be granted on the same kind of showing as would permit 
direction of a verdict were the case to be tried. 
Id. at 871 (quoting 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, $ 1234, p. 133 (Rules ed. 
1958); Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho at 238. 
B. Breach of Contract 
A breach of contract is non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate 
performance. It is a failure without legal excuse, to perform any promise, which 
forms the whole or part of a contract. The burden of proving the existence of a 
contract and fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff, and once those facts are 
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established, the defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative defenses, 
which legally excuse performance. 
Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 746,9 P.3d 1204 (2000) (internal 
citations omitted). "Interpretations and legal effect of an unambiguous contract are questions of law 
over which [the] Court exercises free review." Id. at 748. 
C. Adequacv of Consideration 
"A written instrument is presumptive evidence of a consideration." Idaho Code $ 29-103. 
"This presumption may be rebutted by the party seeking to assert the defense of lack of 
consideration." Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21,936 P.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1997); Idaho Code $29- 
104. 
D. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing "requires that the parties perform, in good faith, 
the obligations imposed by their agreement, and a violation of the covenant occurs only when either 
party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract." Idaho Power Company 
v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho at 750. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing "is an objective 
determination of whether the parties have acted in good faith in terms of enforcing the contractual 
provisions." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Covporation, 141 Idaho at 243. "No covenant will be 
implied which is contrary to the terms of the contract negotiated and executed by the parties." Idaho 
Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho at 750. 
E. Idaho Code 6 50-31 1 
A city may vacate a public street however, a public street cannot be vacated unless all 
property owners consent to the vacation. Idaho Code 5 50-3 1 1; Dale Tr. p. 63,ll. 1-12; p. 86,ll. 22- 
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I 25, p. 87, p. 88,ll. 1-1-3. Furthermore, in vacating a public street, "the right of way, easements and 
franchise rights of any lot owner or public utility shall not be impaired thereby.. .." Idaho Code $ 
50-3 1 I. Vacated streets "shall revert to the owner of adjacent real estate, one-half (112) on each side 
thereof, or as the city council deems in the best interest of adjoining properties ..." Id, 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant has not Failed to Perform a Contractual Duty 
The 1995 Agreement is not ambiguous therefore the interpretation of the Agreement is a 
matter of law. Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho at 748. There is no dispute 
that the 1995 Agreement was contingent upon the occurrence of specific conditions, including 
vacation by the City of Nampa. Complaint, Ex. A, ?/ 1. Once vacated, the parties were to grant 
themselves a perpetual easement on the vacated property for access to and from each parties' 
property -- said access to be at the discretion of property owners. Id. at 7 2. Then the parties would 
execute an agreement defining their rights and obligations. Id. at ?/ 3. The parties would then be 
responsible for maintenance in proportion to the amount of property they own. Id. 
In rendering its Order entered on November 7,2006, the Court determined that it could not 
resolve the contract claim on summary judgment because it found a genuine issue of fact regarding 
whether the 1995 Agreement was in effect in 2004. According to the Court's verbal pronouncement 
of its Decision, if the 1995 Agreement was still in effect in 2004, when Duro-Bilt refused to agree to 
the Fire Department's limited 20' access easement, Duro-Bilt breached the 1995 Agreement; but if 
the 1995 Agreement was not in effect in 2004, there was no breach of the 1995 Agreement. 
However, this Court does not need to resolve the validity of the 1995 Agreement to dispose of 
Plaintiffs contract claim. 
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1. Duro-Bilt was not Obligated to Relinquish Access to its Property Under the 1995 
Agreement or Enter into a New Agreement in 2004. 
According to Plaintiff, Duro-Bilt breached the 1995 Agreement by refusing to cooperate and 
consent in 2004. Plf s Brf. in Objection to Def s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Plf s Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 23 (August 22,2006). The only thing Defendant failed to 
consent to in 2004 was, (1) a brand new agreement limiting the access easement to 20'; and, (2) the 
vacation of the property with only a 20' access agreement. The 20' access easement came up for the 
first time in 2004 when the Narnpa Fire Department issued a letter stating its terms of agreement 
regarding the vacation. Plf 000046. The Fire Department requirements included: (I) a twenty foot 
(20') access easement, and (2) written approval of theNampa Fire Department's access requirement 
by all affected property owners. Id. The 20' access did not exist as a condition to vacation prior to 
August 4,2004, therefore the Fire Department's required evidence of each owner's approval of the 
new condition. See id., Plf 000046. Duro-Bilt refused; however, Duro-Bilt's refusal was not aimed 
at a condition of the 1995 Agreement. Duro-Bilt refused to enter into the entirely new agreement, 
which was outside the scope ofthe 1995 Agreement, proposed 9 years after the original Agreement. 
Because the issue raised by Plaintiff is Duro-Bilt's refusal to agree to a condition that was not part of 
the 1995 Agreement, the Court need not resolve the issue regarding the validity of the 1995 
Agreement in 2004. 
Moreover, the condition and agreement proposed in 2004 conflicts with the express terms of 
the 1995 Agreement. The 1995 Agreement expressly provides for each of the parties to the 
Agreement to have perpetual access to their individual properties from Second and Third Streets via 
the vacated property. Id. at 1 3 .  The 1995 Agreement contains no mention or any reference to any 
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limitation on the width of eachparty's access easement or the parties' consent to any such limitation. 
Indeed, the express contractual provision provides that the parties will have 
a perpetual easement upon vacated First Avenue South for the purpose of access to 
and from their property from both Second and Third Street located in Nampa. The 
actual location of the easement shall be at the discretion of the legal owner of the 
vacated property upon the City's vacation of First Avenue South as described herein. 
Id. 
There is no written instrument obligating Duro-Bilt to agree to a limited 20' access easement. 
See Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21; Idaho Code 9 29-104. First, the 1995 Agreement clearly 
provides an easement: on the vacated property for access to each owner's property located at their 
discretion -- the purpose for such easement being to provide the parties adequate access to and from 
their property from both Second and Third Streets. The 1995 Agreement imposes no limits on the 
size of each party's access easement. Indeed, no size limit was proposed until 2004, when Mr. Wylie 
circulated a proposed new agreement limiting access to only 20'. Limiting the access easement to 
20' imposes an obligation outside the scope ofthe 1995 Agreement. Duro-Bilt did not contract for 
such limited access by way of the 1995 Agreement. 
Second, Duro-Bilt did not enter into a new agreement in 2004. The proposed 2004 
agreement is an entirely new agreement to which Duro-Bilt had no contractual duty to consent. 
Defendant could not agree to the new 2004 contract because doing would cause it to relinquish much 
needed access; and, therefore Duro-Bilt did not execute the 2004 agreement. (The 2004 proposed 
contract also failed to provide consideration for its terms.) If access were limited to 20', Duro-Bilt 
would not receive the access bargained for under the 1995 Agreement and its property and business 
interests would be substantially harmed. Duro-Bilt's rehsal to relinquish needed access is also 
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consistent with Idaho law governing the vacation of public streets. Section 50-331, Idaho Code, 
prohibits vacations that would impair rights-of-ways and easements of any lot owner. 
Even if we assume the parties were still bound by the 1995 Agreement in 2004, Defendant 
did not breach the 1995 Agreement when it refused to agree to the limited 20' access proposed by the 
City Fire Department and Mr. Wylie in 2004. In refusing to agree to the 2004 condition, Duro-Bilt 
acted in accordance with the terms of the 1995 Agreement and Idaho law. 
2. Duro-Bilt did not Breach the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Duro-Bilt's refusal to agree to a condition outside the scope of the 1995 Agreement and enter 
into a new agreement in 2004 was fair and reasonable under the terms of the 1995 Agreement. The 
1995 Agreement expressly provides for access to each owner's property at each owt~er's discretion. 
Defendant's refusal to relinquish access did not violate, nullify or significantly impair any benefit of 
the 1995 Agreement. Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho at 750. What is 
contrary to the terms of the 1995 Agreement is Plaintiffs allegation that Defendant must agree to 
inadequate access. Id. If Duro-Bilt did so, its rights and benefits under the 1995 Agreement would 
be impaired. Therefore, in refusing to agree to the 2004 condition, Duro-Bilt acted fairly and in 
good faith under the terms of the 1995 Agreement. McKnight Tr., p. 71,l. 25, p. 72,ll. 1-9; Jenkins 
v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho 233,243, 108 P.3d 380 (2005). 
3. Performance of the Remaining Conditions of the 1995 Agreement is not Due. 
Likewise, for the reasons stated above, Duro-Bilt has not breached the remaining conditions 
of the Agreement. Additionally, Duro-Bilt has not breached the remaining conditions because: 
a. Performance of subsequent conditions is not due; 
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b. The vacation has been tied up in litigation and was recently remanded back to 
the City for reconsideration in accordance with Judge Morfitt's Order. Until the scope and 
conditions of vacation are finally established by the City Council, the matter is not ripe for 
grant of a perpetual easement; 
c. There is no perpetual easement in the record and the Plaintiff has not 
proposed such easement. Plaintiff admits that no perpetual easement has been drafted or 
granted and that any perpetual easement would be conditioned on agreement by all parties, 
Yorgason Aff., Ex. B, p 64; 
d. There is no evidence that Defendant has refused to discuss or cooperate with 
the parties to the Agreement regarding the grant of a perpetual easement for each party to 
access each party's property. 
The status of the perpetual easement and remaining conditions is no surprise given that they 
cannot occur until the property is vacated. That is why there is no evidence that Defendant has 
breached the 1995 Agreement. Once the City took final action on the vacation ordinance, Plaintiff 
commenced litigation against the City and Defendant. The scope and conditions of the vacation then 
are currently unknown and cannot be known until the matter is finally decided by the City Council in 
accordance with Judge Morfitt's Order. Until then, the remaining conditions cannot be completed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant, by refusing to agree to the limited 
20' access easement proposed in 2004, did not breach the 1995 Agreement, and Defendant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law on Count 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint. Even construing the record in 
Plaintiffs favor, the undisputed facts show that even if the 1995 Agreement is valid, Defendant is 
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not in breach of the 1995 Agreement. There is no disputed evidence to preclude the grant of 
summary judgment in Defendant's favor. Defendant requests attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code $ 5  12-120 and 12-121. 
DATED this 26th day of December, 2006. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHTD. 
~ t t o m e ~ s  for Defendant Duro-Bilt 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 
Page 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of December, 2006, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Jon M. Steele U.S. Mail 
Karl J. F. Runft Hand Delivery 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 - Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele(ii,runftlaw.com 
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JON M. STEELE (XSB tE 1921) 
KARL J. R U W T  (XSB tE 6640) 
RUNJT & STXELE LAW OFFXCES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
I Fax: (208) 343-3246 Email: jmstcclc@runftlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, GEPUW 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDXCI[AL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN O L  COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff; 
VS. 
) B m F  IN RESPONSE TO 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BET GENERATOR, ) DEFENDANT'S SECOM) MOTION 
INC., an Idaho corporation: BART and ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
N,ANE MCKMGHT, husband and wife; ) 
and ROES I through V. 
COMES NOW PlaintiffGoodman Oil Company (Woodmann) and responds to Defendant's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set foHh below, Defendant's Motion should 
be summarily denied. 
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INTRODumXON 
This dispute arises out of proceedings to vacate bhe public right-of-way knowtl as First 
Avenue South between 2& Street South and 3' Street South in Nampa 
Tbis litigation is a spin-off of mandamus and judicial review litigation before Judge Morfitt. 
See, Goodman Oil, Compmry v. Cily of Nampa, The Civ Council of the City of Nampa, Uayor Tom 
Dnk. and Diana lambing and Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, ,TIC.., Case No, CV 0410007, 3' 
Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho (hereafter referred to as the "Goodman Mandamus 
Proceeding"). 
On August 8, 2005, Judge Morfitt, in the Goadman Mandamzrs Proceeding, entered his 
Peremptory Writ ofMandamus (withan ULCP 54@) certificate) orderingNampa to publish Wioe 
No. 3374 'vacating First Avenue South. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Issues of Liability, Batw Nos. 000001-000011. 
The Goodman Mandamus Proceeding also seeks judicial review of the fiRy (SO') foot wide 
easement reserved in CkdhnceNo. 3374. Godman has asked Judge Morfitt to strike the casement. 
On November 7,2006, Judge Morfitt set aside this fifty (50') foot wide easement. He also remanded 
the caw to the City for further considdon. 
Thc vacated stmet is  now owned by thc adjoining property owners. Thc rcscrvedeasement in 
O r d i  No. 3374 has been struck. 
This litigation is the result of Defendant's breaoh of contract and Defendant's role as the 
instigator ofan illegal veto by Nampats Mayor. On September 20,2006, this C o w  dismissed Bart 
and Alane McMght. On November 7,2006, this Court m t e d  D e f d t ' s  Motion for S v  
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Judgment as to Counts 2,3, and 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff's breach of contract claim has 
nat been set Tor trial. 
This dispute would never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had abided by the oontractual tenns it 
agreed to in the Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement (hereafter ''Vacation Agreement"). 
n. 
FACTS 
On August 2,1995, Goodman entered into the Vacation Agreement with Defendant Scotty's 
Dm-Bilt Otsnemtor, Iac. @ e d r  uDum-Biit", the Blamires Family Trust ( h d e r  ' c B l ~ s " ) ,  
and T. J. Forest, Im. @ereafter "For&"'. Goodman, Duro-Bilt, the B1- and Forest were the 
owners of&property adjacent to that portion of ~ i r s t    venue south between 2d Saeet Southand 3" 
Street South. Bart McKnight is  the president and owner of Duro-Bilt. 
In the Vacation Agreement, the parties exchanged mutual promises consenting to Nampa's 
vacation of First Avenue South. The patties gnmted and conveyed among themselves a perpetual 
easement upon the vacated pperty for the purpose of ac~ass to and from their property. The parties 
agreed to fully coopmate to ensure that the purpose add iatent of the Vacation Agreement wa9 
aooamplished, and to equally share in the maintenme of the easement in proportion to the mount of 
prom they owned which adjoins First Avenue South. See, Bates Nos. 000038-000043. 
Prior to v d o n ,  Goodman's property consisted of over 36,800 squaw feet. Blamiiw' 
property consisted of over 17,250 square h t .  Forest owned 3,750 square fwt. Duro-Bilt owned a 
single lot of2,850 squere feet. The building on DuiwBilt7s lot covers almost the entire lot. 
First Avenue South, prior to its vacation, ran north and south and was a street of eighty (80') 
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feet in width and three hundred (300') feet in length The actual cotHmcti?d roadway i s  fbrly (40') 
feet in width, back of curb to back of curb. 
Goodman owns pmprty on both sides ofthe vacated street. Lots 7,8,9,1 I and 12 (each fifty 
(50') feet in width) are located on the west side of the vacated street, Lots 4,5 and 6 (each fiRy (SO') 
feet in widtb) are located on the east side of the vacated street. 
Durn-Kilt is the ownet of Lot 10 located on the west side ofthe vacated street. Lot 10 is 
bordered by Goodman property to the north (Lot 11) to tbe south (Lot 9), aab following vacation of 
First Avenue South, ta the east. 
On August 3, 1995, Goodman submitted an applioation to Nampa for vacation of First 
Avenue South. See, Bates No. 000044. On August 24,1995, Mr. Holm, Nampa Plaaning Director, 
prepcad a Staff Report. The Staff Report lists the applicant as the adjoking properly owners, 
Goodmau, Duro-Bilt, Blamires, and Forest. See, Batea No. 000045. On September 5,1995, a public 
hearing was held and the Nampa City Council (h&r "Council") approved the vacari.on of First 
Avenue South between 2nd Stred South and 3rd Street South. See, Bates No. 000098. 
In 1999 and 2001, Goodman hqpked ofNampa re& the status of the vacation of Fist 
Avenue South Planning Dinxtox Holm confumed that the v d o n  o f F i  Avenue Sou& had been 
approved by the Council on September 5,1995. 
On July 28, 2004, Goodman and James R Wyli (Wylie) signed a Pun:hase and Sale 
Agreement whereby Goodman agreed to sell its property, Thc? sale price was Six Hundred Thousand 
($600,000) Dollars to be paid in cash at closing, The only contingency was completing the vacation 
of First Avenue South in a manner acceptable to Goodman and Wylie. See, I3am Nos. 000203- 
000206. 
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In Ay~ust of 2004, Goodman and Wylie informed Defendant of this sale and that the sslc was 
conthgmt upon the sucwssfd vacation of Fitst Avenue South. See, Bares No. 0001 78. 
On August 4,2004, the Nampa Fire Depament provided writtm conditional approval of 
development plans for the vaoated property and the pmperty owned by Goodman. See, Bates Nos. 
000046 and 000179. The development plans had been submitted by Wylie. The Nampa Fire 
Department approved the vacation of First Avenue South subject to a dedicated twenty (20') foot 
wide fire apparatus access road. The Fire Depasment also requested Wylie to obtain the consent, 
once again, of the! adjoining p r o m  ownm. See, Bates No. 000046. It is now Duro-Bilt's 
contention that it had and has no obligation to agree to a twenty (20') foot wide easement. 
&& to entering into the Purchase and Sale Agreement with Wylie, Gocdman rhrough Mr. 
Coaley, its president (hereafter UConley''J o f f d t o  sell the Goodman property to Duro-Bilt on the 
exact same term as made available to Wylie. AAer signing the WmanMrylie Purchase and Sele 
Agreement, Wylie visited McKnight 3 or 4 times during July and August of 2004. Wylie told 
McKnight about the pending M e  aad the need to complete the street vacation. Both Conley and 
Wylie will test* that Defendant had knowtedge of the GoodmanAVyIie Purchase and Sale 
Agreement and that Defendant knew that the transaction was eontingent upon the s u m f d  vacation 
of Fit  Avenue South. Wylie wked Ruro-Bilt to sign the consent quested by the Fire Department 
Wylie will testify that McIEni.&t agreed to sign the consent fom presented to him after the other 
property omem signed After Wylia obtainedthe m m t  of the other property ownen, he mturned 
to DumBilt Duro-Bikt .ten refused itr consent Sea, Bates Nos. 0001 78-0001 79. 
On August 16,2004, the vacation ordinance ("Ordinam No. 3374") was approved by the 
Council and the Uayor. 
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MoKni&htYs efforts to interdict Ordinance No. 3374 began with spaking to a Nampa City 
Cl& and teLlmg tlie Ci:ity Clerk he no longer consented to the vacation of First Avenue South and 
wished to prevent Ordinance No. 3374 fkom going into effect. The City Clerk directed McKnight to 
call the City Attorney, Mi.  White. McKnight called the City Attorney that same day and voiced his 
objections to OrdinanceNo. 3374. McKnight was told by Mr. White that, ''they could withdraw this 
if X talked to the mayor." McKnight then, again that same day, called Nampa City Hall, spoke to 
Mayor Dale, and explained his objection to the vacation. Mayor Dale agwd to veto O r d i i c e  No. 
3374. McWght specifically recalled this exchange in his deposition testimony: 'CI asked him [the 
Mayor] if there was a way tn pull this off of being published, and he said, 'Yes, I can veto it."' See, 
Bates Nos. OWlSO-000181. 
Ad e-mail dated August 19,2004, from the City Clerk, Diana Lambing, had the following 
memge to Cris Luna and Debomh Bishop, deputy clerks at the Nampa City Clerks office: 
Hi Kids! 
Just a little note to let you know that at the Mayor and Teny White's direction, 
I pulled this Ordinrmce for Vacation of First Avenue South fhn be& 
published One of the paper& o ~ l l l w  is riot in agreement anymoxe. SO it is 
on hold untii fmther notice. 
mds .  
See, Bates Nos. 0001 79-0001 80. 
OnSeptembe~2~, MayoxRdevetoed OrdinanceNo, 3374. See, BatwNos. 000180-000181. 
It was Mayor Dale's only veto since the beginning ofhis term. This is the only veto seen by P~~ 
D%or Holm in his 27 years with the City. See, Bates No. 000180. The veto wag ixastigated by 
Defendant. 
McrCnight's objection to Ofdinatwe No. 3374 was aided by the fact he is a %end of Mayor 
Dale. McKnight and the Mayor have paaicipated in aivic activities and events. McKni&M and the 
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Mayor have mutual fiends, specifically Council member %me. It ww Thorne who at the August 
14,2003 Comcil meeting, moved that Ordinance NO. 3374 be passed &under mpmsion ofthe rules. 
See, Batas No. 0001 80. 
McKni$M, Thome and the Mayor had been on a ski trip together to Sun Valley in Maroh of 
2004. Mayor Dale describes Mcfight  as a friend. See, Bates No, 000180. 
ln his deposition, Mayor Dale confhed  McKnight's material, expurfe contact, recalling 
that "he WcKnight] conveyed to me that, as a property owner on tbat &eef he did not agree to the 
vacation at &is time." Concerning his decision to veto Odnance No. 3374, the Mayor Wed: 
[OJne ofthe ways of dealing with this ms with a veto. Another way was to 
bring it back before city council. Becaw, since the ordinanoe had not been 
published, it had not become law at this time. And the city council could 
have brought it back and reconsidered it and voted on it. It was my decision 
tbat the most expedient way to do it was through the veto. 
See, Bates No, 000181. 
Once learning of Mayor Dale's veto, Conley visited McKaigLn at his place of business. 
MclCnight said he didn't like WyIie and thiat he (McKnight) wanted to purchase the Goodman lots 
which rufjoinexi his property to the south, the one with the car lot. 
troodman jm,medi~tely wrote to the Mayor and Council in an effort to save the transaction 
with Wylie. Goodman argued to the Mayor and Council on September 20h that the Mayor did not 
have authority to veto ordinance No. 3374. Goodman mote to the Mayor and Council on three (3) 
sepaiate ~ i o n s ,  explaining that the Mayor's veto would seriously jeopardize Ooodman's 
transaction with Wyiie. Goodman told the Mayor and Council that it would file apetition for Writ of 
Mandate if the City a fused to amend and publish Onlinance No. 3374. The Mayor and Co&l 
refused to ovenide the Mayor's veto. See, Bates Nos. 000181-000182. 
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consented. ~ o i m  also t e $ ~ A  that the vacation ~pament,  signed L, Bilt, was more formal 
and detailed than the usual consents received for street vacations. Sce, Bates No. 000177. 
Holm Imows of no source of authority allowing the Nampa Fie Department to request an 
access easement be reserved in a street: vacation ordinance. See, Bates No. 000178. 
Holm also has no expectation that a detailed easement would be submitted to the City of 
Nmpa until such time as the propty owner or dewloper mks a building pennit. Xee, Bates No. 
000178. 
'Ibis is standard practice in the developmeat ofa commercial site. The actual description of 
an easement is not haitzed until such time as the site requirements are determined. The ownarand 
designer must have some flexibility in d&&g buildings and providing for access, but yet comply 
with local standards. The building review process pmvides the City ofNarnpa with the opportunity 
to review development plans and at that time to establish, if necessary, appropriate easemen&. The 
Nampa F h  Department, as a consulting agency, hasthe opportunity to review and comment on 
development plans when they ate submitted. But they have no statutory authority over a street 
I 
I 
vacation or the issuance of a bullding permit. 
I 
I This Complaint alleging breach of the Vaeatiou Agreement by Duro-Bflt, was filed on 
I September 19,2005. The case has been set for trial. 
I The damages inclIt.red by Goodman an! dependent upon the result of the judicial review 
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G o o d m m ' s ~ & o n  with Wylie failed by reason that the vacation had not been oompleted 
in m a~ceptable mama. See, Bates No. 0001 82. 
Planning Exector Holm stated in his deposition, that all that was required &om the adjoining 
prowdings before Judge Morfitt. 
m 
STANDARD OF R)SVlEW 
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court must liberally construe the facts in the 
existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, drawing all reawnable hfemces in favor of the 
nonmoving patty. 7710mson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Iirtc., I26 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1994). 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, deposithas, and admissions on file, together with 
the aBdavits, if any, show that the= is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entifled to a judgment as a matter of law." McCqv v. Lyons* 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 
360,364 (1991). Ifthere are conflicting inferences arising Born the record orreawnable minds might 
reaoh different ~~nclusions, summary judgmeat must be denied on those points ofdiffemnc~?. Born 
v. SudweeRs, 1 19 Idaho 539,808 P.2d 876 (1991). 
IV. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION 
BOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FAJJiS 
Earlier in tbis litigatiog Duro-Bilt contended(a) that there was novalid conm between the 
parties (page 12, Defendant's' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Sumcnary 
Judgment); (b) thfd the Vacation Agreement lapsed due to failure of  the vacation @age 12, 
Mndants' Memorandurn in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (c) that the 
Vacation Agreement did not mtain a cantract term and thmfore should be deemed to have lgsed 
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@age 13, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Rehdants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (d) 
that the Vacation Agreement was invalid for lack of consideration (page 15, Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (e) that even if the 
Vacation Ammerit was valid JbwBilt is  excused Emm performance @age 17, Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (0 that Duro-Bilt has 
acted fairly and in good faith (page 17, DefendmtsMemorandum in SuppartofDefeMfants%otion 
for Summary Judgment); and (g) that G o o d m  has breachedits duty of good hith and fair dealing 
@age 19, DefendantsMemorandm in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment). 
All of these contentions were found by this Court ta be without merit 
Having failed in its first Summary Judgment Motion, Duro-Bilt now contmd8 that. . . 'Ws 
Court does not need to resolve the validity of the 1995 Agmment to dispose of Plaintiffs contract 
claim," Page 8, Memomdum in Support 0fZ)efendant's Sewnd Motion for Summery Judgment. 
Dm-Bilt mvenimtly ignores the multiple breach of contract issues md d i i  the Court's 
attention to the request of the Fire Deptmmt for a twenty (20') foot wide acce9s emement. 
As this Court is aware, the Nampa Fire Depattment is merely a consulting agency andhas no 
power to require mytlhg in regards to a street vacation. Goodman's claim for W h  of the 
Vacation Agreement is a I i t e d  to Duro-Bilt's 1y:.tbaIto sign the consent circulated by Mr. Wylie. 
This refusal is but one event in Dedan t ' s  course of conduct refuting the Vacation Agreement 
agreedto in 1995. 
e The Vacation Agreement is a Valid Contmd. 
Defendant's various contentions concede the exist- of a contract behvtwn Goodman and 
Dur6Bit. There must %st be a contract befm it can lapse or be otherwise unenfo&le. 
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The plain language of the Vacation Agreement establishes a contract between Goodman and 
The Vacation Agreement provides the following: 
... the parties, for good and valuable consideration the receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged, agree as fouows: 
1. That the .parties consent to the City of Nampa's vacdon of Fit 
Avenue South, located between Blocks 16 and 19 of Pleasants Addition 
above-described, as a pubtic right-of-way as depicted on exhibit ''A''attached 
-0. 
2. That ther parties grant and convey among themselves, their agents, 
l i c w s ,  and assignees a pqs tud  easement upon v W  First Avenue 
South for the purpose of access to and from their properly from bath S w n d  
and Third Street located in Nmpa, Canyon County, Idaho. The actual 
location of the easement shall be at the discretion of the legal owner of the 
vacated property upon the City's vacationof First Avenue South as d&W 
herein. 
3. That the parties shall Wly wopaate to on~ura that the purpose and 
intent of this Agreement shall be a~cgm~lished. The uarties shall execute a 
f o m l i i  cent recopking the and obl&atiom of the paties 
upon the City of Nampa's vacation of First Avenue South as described 
hercin. The parties shall equally share in the rnahtmmce ofsziideasement m 
proportion to the amount of property they own which adjoins First Avenue 
South as described hemin, 
4. That the parties shall hold each other hamless and indemni& the 
other parties h m  theu negligent act and that of their agents in maintaining 
and using said access easement. 
5. This Agreement shall be binding upon mil inure to the benefit ofthe 
parties and their respective successors, assigns, heizs, and 
represmtatiives. 
See, Bates Nos. OMM38.000040. 
The bunfen of proving the existence of a contract and faot of its breach is upon the plaintiff, 
and once those facta me estiblishwt, the defendant has burden of pleading md proving atEnnative 
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defen.ses wfiich legally excuse pertormance. See, O'&lll v. Basube, 119 Idaho 796,813,810 P.2d 
l082,1099 (1991). 
The existence of a contract between Goodman and Dum-Bilt m o t  be seriously disputed. 
b. The Vacation Agreement did not Lapse due to Failure of the Vaeation. 
Defendant previously contented that without a street vacation, there is no contract. See, page 
1.2, ]Defendaotsy M e m o d m  in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This 
contention ignores the fact that First Avenue South is vacated. Judge Morfttt's Order Granting Writ 
of Mandamus was a ficnal appealable Order and included a 54(b) c d c a t e .  See, Bates Nos. 00000 1 - 
000002. Neither the City of Nampa, Duro-Bilt, nor anyone else appealed. 
Consent of all adjoining proply owner's is apm-requisite to a vacation prmxkg. Idaho 
Code 9 50-1321. The oniy Duro-Bile consent provided to the Nampa Planning Director, to the 
N a p  Council and to Judge Mofitt  we^ the Vwtion Agrec?ment. No one but Defendant believes 
Consent is an jssue. 
The issue of Duro-Bilt's consent has beenjudicially resolved by Judge MorEtt and Dum-Bilt 
is estopped fmm contending otheMrise. 
c. The Vaeation Agreement has not h p e d  for FafIum to Include a Tern for Performance. 
Defendant still contends that no easement exists. See. Refendant's Memorandutn in Support 
of Defenbt's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, page 12. Defendant's contention ignores the 
self executing language of the Vacation Agreement. The partim to the Vacation Agreement ". . .grant 
and convey among themselves.. .a perpetual easament ujx~n the vacated First Avenue South for Fore 
purpose of access to and @om their property fxom both Second md Third Street located in Nampa, 
Canyon County, Idaho." 
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Defendant's contation that the peqwtml easement does not exict is contradiacd by the 
record. 
A grant of aperpetua1 easement is not unusual. See, Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners, et al 
v. Gatfield Bay Resort, Inc., 139 Idaho 699,701,85 P.3d 675,677 (2004) ("...the owner intended to 
grant a perpetual easement.. ."); Mountainview Landowners Cooperative Association, Inc,., et al v. 
Cool, 136 P.3d 332, 334 (2006) ("...[a] perpetual easement i s  granted to the gmtees...3 on 
rehearing ('"the graat in this case was only of a perpetual easement.") 
The Vacation Agreement is a conveyance of an interest in red pmpetty. Se&: Idaho Code S, 
The ~w! of the word "put" in the Vacation Agreement has significant legal effect. The 
word "grant" carries with it statutory covembts. Idaho Code a 55-612 states in relevant part W: 
From the urre of the word 'grant' in any conveyance ... the foUowing 
covfflants.. . are implied, udlw rtslrahd by apess m s  cmt&~ed in such 
conveyance: 
1. That previous to the h e  of the exeoution of such conveyance, the grantor 
has not wnveyed the same estate, or my ri& title or interest therein, to any 
person other than the grantee. 
2. That such estate is at the time ofthe execution.. . from en.cua.bnmces 
done, made or dered by the grantor, or any person claiming under him. 
Su& covenants may be sued upon in the same mmmer ag if they had been 
expressly W e d  in the conveyance. 
Idaho Code 8 55-606 provides that -[elvery grant or conveyam ofan estate in real propew 
is conclusive against the grantor." 
Lhtu-Bilt is condusively bound by the Vacation Agreement. The tam of the Vacaton 
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d. ]Defendant's Contention That the Vacation Agreement h Invalid for Lackof Consideration 
Faib as a Matter of Law. 
hro-Bilt's previous contention that the Vacation Agrennent fails for lack of consideration is 
based upon Duro-Bilt's expectation of a development incentive. See, page 14, Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support ofDefendantsl Motion for S- Judgment. 
7% contention fails as a matter of law. Dum-Bilt bears the! burden of proof in showing a 
want of cansideration. Idaho Code Ej 29-104. 
In interpreting a contrsct, the primary function of the wurt is to seek and csny out the intent 
of the parties. See, Hr)g~n v. Blakney, 73 Idaho 274,279,251 P.2d 209,213 (1952). "The soope of 
...[ the court's] inquiry into the parties' intent is limited, however, by the general ntle that ifadeed is 
plain and unambiguous the parties' intent must be ascertained only &om the deed itself, par01 
evidence b e i i  inadmissible for that purpose." Phillips Industries, Znc. v. Firkinr, 121 Idaho 693, 
697,827 P.2d 706,710 (1992) (citing Gordner v. Fleigel, 92 Idaho 767,450 P.2d 990 (1969)). 
The w n s i d d o n  clause of the Vacation Agreement binds Rum-Bilt. Hall v. Hall, 116 
Idaho 483,484,777 P.2d 255,265 (1989) (("Where as here, the consideration clause clearly recites 
that the transfer was made 'For Vaiw: Received", pml evidence is  not admissible to contradid the 
deed.. .."). 
Defendant contends that they received no consideration for entering into the V d o n  
Apment.  h fact, Defendant mceived the substantial consideration and benefit of a perpetual 
acwss easement fkom three adjoining property owners. 
The term "easement" may be said broadly to be aprivilege which the owner ofone tenement 
h a right to enjoy over the tenement of mother; a right which one pemon has to use the land of 
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mother for a specific purpose, or a servitude imposed as a burden upon land 17A Am. Jur. 616, Ej 1. 
The following definition is contained in Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, p. 599: 
Easement. G right bt the owner of one parcel of land, by reason of such 
ownership, to use the land of another for a special purpose not inconsistent 
witb a general pmperty in the owner. Hollomon v. Board of Education of 
Stewart County, 168 Cia. 359,147 S.E. 882,884; Rye v. Sihbitt, 145 Neb. 
600,17 N.W.2d 617,621. 
Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514,520,365 P.2d 952,955 (1961). 
The considemtion olause of the Agreement bars Defendant's contentions that they received 
no considetation for entering into the Vacation Agmement. Additionfly, the granting of cross 
easements for access is  I& and substantial consideration. 
e. Dura-BZ& ia not Excused From Performance. 
Duro-Bilt fails to cite any legal authority for this contention. Duro-Kit's argumentis that 
Goodman has been unwilling to consider other options and enter& adiscussion Essentially Duw 
Bilt's complaints are that no one has voluntmred to give RumB'it anew building and to move the 
Duro-Bilt business at no cost. h his deposition, McKnight testified as follows: 
Q. Just to 90ft of sum things up, is it fair to say that the h e t  vacation 
agreement is satjsfactoryto you if a developer weteta come in and give you a 
new building at no cost and move you to &at new location? 
A. ltwas- 
MR. W L A M .  Object to the form. 
THE WlTWSS: It was in 1995. 
Q. BY MR. STEELB: 1s it different now7 
A. Yes. 
Q. How is ir different now? 
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A. Well, my business has grown. I now would just have to weigh the 
options. I'm nine years older. 
Q. SO if a developer came to you now and said, "Mr. McKnight, we're going 
to move you at no cost to you and give you a new building," you wouldn't 
agrea to that? 
MR. HALLAM: Objeotion, incomplete hypothetical. 
MR. YORQASON: Objwtion. 
THB WITNESS: I would entertain the option. 
Q. So you can't really give me any conditions or tenns under which you 
would agree to vacation of the street in fmnt of your building - - in front of 
your business? 
A. If you laid a proposal in &nt of me, I would take some time to look at it. 
See, Bates No. 000253. See also, Yorgason .Midavit, p. 2. 
E DumBiIt Contends that it ha$ Acted Fairly and in Good Faith. 
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a wv- implied by law in the 
Vacation Agreement. See, First Security Bankof ldaho v. Guigs, 115 Idaho 172,176,765 P.2d 683, 
687 (1988); Clement v. Farmersins. &hang#, 115 Idaho 298,300,766P.2d 768,770 (1988) (The 
covenent requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations inkpodby their agreement, 
md a violation ofthe covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or s i ~ ~ y  impah 
any benefit ofthe contract. See, Idaho First Naf. Bunk v. Bliss ValIey Focldr, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 
289,824 P.2d 841,863 (1991). See also, Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas. Co., 116 Idaho 622,627, 
778 P.2d 744,749 (1989). 
Defada.ut's contention that it has acted fhkly and in good f%th finds no support in the facts 
of rhis case. 
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DURO-BlLT*S BREACH OF TEDT VACATION AGREEMENT 
Duro-Bilt breacbed the Vaoation Agreement's covemts by withdrawing its consent and 
instigating the veto (a breach of para. 1 ofthe Vacation Agreement); by conthual1y d e m g  the grant 
of the perpetual easement (a breach of para. 2 of tbe Vacation Agreement); by f s i l i  to l l l y  
cwperats to ensure that the purpose and intant of the Agreement is accomplished (a-h ofpara. 3 
of the Vacation Apemeat); by i.b contentions that the Vacation Agreement has failed ( a breach of 
p. 5 of the Vacation Agreement); and by its breach ofthe covenant of good faith and Mdealings, 
A breach of wntract is non-mormance of a conktual  duty. See, Enterprise, Inc. v. 
Nmpa City, % Id&o 734,740,536 P.2d 729,735 (1975) (quoting Remtement of the JAW of 
Contracts 4 312 (1932)). It [t a failwe, without legal excuse,to perform any promise, which foms 
the whole or pert of a wntract See, Hughes v. Idaho State University, 122 Idaho 435,437,835'P,2d 
670,672 (Ct. App. I9W) (quoti~g Black's Law Dictionary 188 (6' ed. 1990)). 
The existence ofthe contract and Wup~.B'ilt's breach am established beyond dispute. It is an 
undisputed fact that Defendant intended to stop the progress of the vacation. McKnight testified as 
follows: "Well, if it's stopping progress of the vacation, then that's okay with me." See, Bates No. 
000251. Defendant still denies the existence of the perpetusl easeme See, Memorandum in 
Support ofDefendmt's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, page 12. 
Duro-Bilr's conduct not only breached its duties under the Vacation Apemettt but the same 
conduct resulted in k i l l i  the CbodmanlWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
The facts of Lhro-Bilt's breach afthe Vamion Agreement are amply set forth above. k 
is no genuine issue as to these essential and tmconmv& facts'. 
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1. The Vacation Agreement is valid and enforceable, including the perpetual easement. 
2. In July and August 2004, Duro-Bilt refused to cooperate and consent to the vacation 
procedure in breach of the Vacation Agreement covenant$. 
3. Despite Duro-Bilt's tt:W to consent and cooperate, Ordinanae No. 3374 vacating the 
street was passed and approved. 
4. Duro-Bdt (through McKnight) was the instigator of the illegal veto of Ordinance No. 
3374. He obtained the! veto by withdrawing his consent. 
5. Dwo-Bilt, to this day, contends it has not consented, still refuses to cooperate in the 
v d o a  of the meet, and refhses to recognize the perpetual easement and the validity of 
the Vanation Agreement. 
Both parties agree tbat tk Vaeation Agreement is not ambiguous and that its interpretation 
is amatter of law. The language of the Vacation Agreement is plain and clear. Duro-Bilt's various 
contentions are without merit. 
Duro-Bilt's conduct, in addition to a breach of the express covenantr, of the Vacation 
Agreement, also bmches the covenant of good Xth and fair dealing. This duty obligaWDuro-Bilt 
to woperate with the other parties to the V d o n  Agreement $0 tbat eaoh could obtain the full 
benefit of perf-ca. 
A violation of the covenant occurs when apcnty violate$ nullifies oz significantly impaim any 
benefit ofthe contract, Sorensen v. Comm. Tels, Inc., 1 1  8 Idaho 664,669,799 P.2d 70,75 (1990). 
The duty and breach of this covenant have been established. 
Considering the en* ofthe Vacation Agmment, giving meaning to all provisions of the 
Agmmcn$ considering the undisputed fa& and the application of law, Goodman is endfled to 
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Sununary Judgment on the issue of Dum-Bilt's b w h  of the Vacation Agreement. Duro-Bilt's 
Second Motion for Summmy Judgment should be summarily denied. 
I.n August of 2004 a unique opportunity was pmented to the City of Nampa and the property 
owners adjoining First Avenue South. An experienced developer was wilhg to invest his time, 
effort md capital into a development that would have enhanced the gabway to Nmpa. lhro-Bilt 
killed that opportunity. It may be years before that opportunity presents itself again. 
Duto-Bilk although contractually bound to cooperate and having already consented to the 
stmt vacation and to a perpeal easement, broke its promises. The result is  ise one Defendant 
intended and had hoped to achieve. Defendant is directly ~sponsible for ortorpedoing a development 
that would have enhanced the gateway to Nampaby deliberately breaching the Vacation Agreement. 
Defendant now must bear msponsiM1ity for its ill conceived choices and conduct. 
Defmdant's motion should be summarily denied and this case set for IAal. 
DATED chis - day of January 2007. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEEL£? 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CIERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this pdaY of January 2007, a true and 
correct ww of the forenoina BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR S ~ Y  J u I ~ & ~ ~ ~ N T  was w e d  upon opposing c o ~ ~ s e 1  as follows: 
Christopher Yorgason ~ U S M B ~ ~  
Moore Smith Bwtan & Turke, Chtd. Pemnal Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 7 -Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES. PLLC 
By: J A B  
JON M. STELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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SUSAN E. BUXTON, ISB # 4041 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN, ISB # 5450 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 West Bannock, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1 800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
F I  L . R D  
-.M 7' P.M. 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
B MERCADO, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
1 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
1 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
v. 1 
) DEFENDANT'S REPLY BRIEF IN 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
INC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I ) SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
through V. ) JUDGMENT 
) 
Defendants. ) 
COMES NOW, Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. ("Duro-Bilt" or "Defendant"), 
by and through its attorneys of record, Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submits its 
Reply in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 26, 
2006, on the remaining issue in this case: Count 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint - Breach of Contract. 
Defendant received Plaintiffs Response Brief on January 1 1,2007. 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Duro-Bilt and Plaintiff have, on numerous occasions, summarized the facts for the Court; 
and, therefore, Duro-Bilt will do its best to avoid unnecessarily repeating facts here. However, 
because Plaintiff has misstated the undisputed evidence in the record, some reiteration is necessary. 
Plaintiff's case concerns the alleged breach of a 1995 Property Owner Street Vacation 
Agreement (the "1995 Agreement" or "Vacation Agreement"), whereby the parties to the 1995 
Agreement agreed to the City ofNampa's vacation of First Avenue South betweenBlocks 16 and 19 
of Pleasants Addition on the following terms and conditions: 
1. City action approving the vacation of lSt Avenue South; 
2. The parties granting a perpetual easement on the vacated property among 
themselves for access to and from each party's property, which access is to be at the discretion of 
property owners; 
3. The parties executing an agreement defining their rights and obligations afker the 
City vacated the street; 
4. The parties sharing of maintenance of the vacated property in proportion to the 
amount of property they each own. 
Complaint, Ex. A, 77 1-3. 
The vacation is still held up by paragraph 1 of the 1995 Agreement; and, therefore, the 
subsequent conditions and obligations of the Agreement are not ripe for performance. There is no 
vacated street because: (I) there was no final vacation in 1995, because the City did not act on the 
vacation; (2) or, in 2004, because Plaintiffs filed suit against the City regarding the vacation; (3) or, 
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at present, because Judge Morfitt has remanded the vacation ordinance back to the City for a 
determination of public interest and impairment of rights. 
Starting with current events first, Judge Morfitt recently entered his decision (1) setting aside 
the 50' easement in Ordinance No. 3374; and (2) remanding OrdinanceNo. 3374 to the City Council 
for a determination of whether the Ordinance is in the best interest of adjoining property owners, is 
not an impairment of easement and franchise rights belonging to any lot owner or public utility, and 
"a finding of expedience for the public good." Memorandum Decision and Order, Goodman Oil 
Company v. City of Nampa, et a1 and ScottyS Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., Case No. CV 04-10007 
(Nov. 7,2006), Zokan Aff., Ex. A, pp. 9-12. Consequently, despite Plaintiffs representations to the 
contraty, the street is not vacated. Id. at p. 2; see Plf s Brf. at p. 2 (Jan. 11,2007). 
Plaintiff further misrepresents the vacation as approved in 1995,1999, and 2001. Pltf s Brf. 
at p. 4 (Jan. 11. 2007). The vacation could not be approved until the City Council took action to 
approve the vacation and the undisputed evidence of record shows that the City did not take action 
approving the proposed vacation until 2004. Zokan Aff., Ex. A (Morfitt Decision), p. 2; Plf 0001 17, 
25 1. No ordinance related to the vacation was adopted in 1995 or anytime thereafter prior to 2004. 
Id. The City tabled the proposed vacation on October 16,1995. Plf 0001 17. The Ordinance was 
tabled because the City Fire Department never approved the vacation. Zokan Aff., Ex. A (Morfitt 
Decision), p. 2. 
Additional undisputed facts that deserve repeating are that Duro-Bilt consented to the 
Vacation Agreement in 1995, Yorgason Aff. Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 71 11. 1-4, and the 1995 
Agreement protected each party's access to their property. Affidavit of Chris E. Yorgason in 
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Support of Defendant's Motions filed on June 16,2006 (hereinafter "Yorgason Aff."), Ex. B (Conley 
Tr.), p. 72 11. 1-4; Complaint, Ex. A 7 2. The 1995 Agreement did not assign a width to each party's 
access but left the location of such access to the discretion of each property owner. Yorgason Aff., 
Ex. B (Conley Tr.), p. 72 11. 1-4, p. 75 11. 24-25, p. 76 11. 1-4; Complaint, Ex. A 7 2. Duro-Bilt 
consented to the Vacation Agreement in 1995. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A, (McKnight Tr.) p. 71 11. 1-4. 
Duro-Bilt did not mind vacating lSt Avenue South so long as it had an easement for sufficient access. 
Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 62 11. 11-16. And adequate access is exactly what the 
1995 Agreement provides all the parties to the 1995 Agreement. Complaint, Ex. A 7 2. 
Then, nine years later a new condition of vacation, which proposed to limit the width of each 
party's access to 20' was presented to the parties to the 1995 Agreement. On August 4,2004, before 
the matter was raised again before the City Council, the Nampa Fire Department issued a letter 
stating its terms of agreement regarding the vacation. Zokan Aff., Ex. A (Morfitt Decision), p. 2; Plf 
000046. The requirements included: (1) a twenty-foot (20') access easement, and (2) written 
approval of the Narnpa Fire Department's access requirement by all affected property owners. Id. 
The 20' access did not exist as a condition to vacation prior to August 4, 2004, hence the Fire 
Department's requirement for owner approval. See id., Plf 000046. This is the condition to which 
Defendant refiised consent. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 88 11.21-25, p. 89 11. 1-7, p. 90 
11. 4-10,p. 96,p. 99 11. 14-25, p. 100 11. 1-5. 
In 2004, Mr. Wylie approached Duro-Bilt and asked that it sign a new agreement signifying 
its agreement to the Nampa Fire Department's August 4,2004, 20' access requirement. See Plf 
000233,000250; Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.), pp. 47-51, Ex. 6. Mr. Wylie toldDui-o-Bilt that 
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Duro-Bilt's agreement to the 20' access easement was required for the vacation of 1' Avenue South 
to be finalized by the City Council. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 90 11. 4-9. 
Understanding that access would be limited to a mere 20' if the vacation were approved by the City, 
Duro-Bilt refused to sign the document because the 20' easement did not provide adequate access to 
Duro-Bilt's property and would injure Duro-Bilt's business. Plf 000250-251,253; Yorgason Aff., 
Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 88,ll. 21-25, p. 89,ll. 1-7. 
Defendant disagreed with the proposed 20' access and contacted the City to voice its lack of 
consent thereto and the Mayor attempted to veto the ordinance. Plaintiffs on the other hand wanted 
the vacation approved but disagreed with the vacation ordinance, as adopted, because it contained a 
50' access easement, and filed a complaint against the City and Duro-Bilt. 
11. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff alleges Duro-Bilt breached the 1995 Agreement in its entirety. Complaint 1146-48. 
Such breach is not possible because (1) Duro-Bilt consented to the Agreement in 1995, and (2) lSt 
Avenue South has not been vacated. Duro-Bilt consented to the Vacation Agreement in 1995, 
therefore paragraph 1 of the Vacation Agreement has been satisfied and there has been no breach. 
Complaint, Ex. A 7 1; Complaint 148(a); Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 71 11. 1-4. And 
since consenting to vacation under the terms of the 1995 Agreement, Duro-Bilt has cooperated to the 
extent due under the 1995 Agreement. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), pp. 82-85. 
Until the street is vacated performance of the other terms and conditions of the 1995 
Agreement is not due. Complaint 11 48(b)-(g); Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.), p 64 11.12-23, p. 
68 11. 1-8; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), pp. 82-85. (As illustration, since the street has not 
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I been vacated, there is no vacated property on which the parties can designate access and grant 
perpetual easements among themselves to the same.) Plaintiff admits that the other conditions of the 
1995 Agreement are not due and that Plaintiffhas not attempted to fulfill the other conditions of the 
Agreement. Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.), p 64 11. 12-23, p. 68 11. 1-8. 
The only consent required of Duro-Bilt by the 1995 Agreement has beenmet by Duro-Bilt's 
consent to the vacation of 1" Avenue South under the terms and conditions of the 1995 Agreement. 
Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 71 11.1-4. Duro-Bill has only refused to consent to a street 
vacation that does not provide adequate access to and from Duro-Bilt's property, whichDuro-Bilt is 
expressly entitled to under the 1995 Agreement. Complaint, Ex. A, 77 1-2. Indeed, Plaintiff readily 
admits that Duro-Bilt and the other parties to the 1995 Agreement are entitled to adequate access 
under the 1995 Agreement. Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.), p. 72 11. 1-4. Duro-Bilt is also 
entitled to insure that its easement and right of way is not impaired under Idaho Code 550-31 1. 
In 2004, Plaintiff advised Duro-Bilt the access easement would be limited to 20' if the 
vacation was approved by the City Council and asked Duro-Bilt to agree to the 20' easement. 
Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.) p. 90 11.4-9. Duro-Bilt refused because 20' access was not 
adequate and the 1995 Agreement provides each party to the 1995 Agreement access, without limits 
on width, to and from their property at each party's discretion. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), 
p. 88 11.1-21,p. 89 11.1-7; Complaint, Ex. A y2. Consequently, evenassumingthe 1995 Agreement 
is a valid legal contract today and taking Plaintiffs groundless accusations and misstatements of fact 
as true for the purposes of summary judgment, Defendant has not breached the 1995 Agreement and 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 




Duro-Bilt did not breach any obligation due under the 1995 Agreement or breach the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There is no dispute that the 1995 Agreement was contingent 
upon the occurrence of specific conditions, including vacation by the City of Nampa. Complaint, 
Ex. A, f 1. First, the parties executing the 1995 Agreement consented to the vacation of 1" Avenue 
South in accordance with the terms of the 1995 Agreement; and, therefore the first condition of the 
Vacation Agreement has been met. Id.; Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 71 11. 1-4. It has 
not been breached. The remaining conditions are contingent on the vacation of is' Avenue South. 
Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.), p. 64 11. 12-22, p. 68 11. 1-8; Complaint, Ex. A. 
Once vacated, the parties were to grant themselves a perpetual easement on the vacated 
property for access to and from each party's property -- said access to be at the discretion of property 
owners. Id. at f 2. Then the parties would execute an agreement defining their rights and obligations. 
Id. at f 3. The parties would then be responsible for maintenance in proportion to the amount of 
property they own. Id There is no dispute that 1" Avenue South has not been vacated; and, therefore, 
there is no dispute that the subsequent conditions and obligations under the 1995 Agreement were 
not due in 2004 (and still are not due today). Since the contract conditions were not due at the time 
of the alleged breach, Duro-Bilt cannot be held in breach. Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, 
Inc., 134 Idaho at 746. 
Plaintiff alleges that Duro-Bilt breached the 1995 Agreement by refusing to cooperate and 
consent in 2004. PIP s Brf. in Objection to DeP s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
PIP s Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 23 (August 22,2006). The only thing Defendant failed to 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OR DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 
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,a 
consent to in 2004 was, (1) a brand new agreement limiting the access easement to 20'; and, (2) the 
1 vacation of the property with only a 20' access easement. The 20' access easement came up for the 
first time in 2004 when the Nampa Fire Department issued a letter stating its terms of agreement 
regarding the vacation. Plf 000046. Mr. Wylie told Duro-Bilt that it must agree to the new 20' 
condition for the vacation to be approved by the City. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A (McKnight Tr.), p. 90 11. 
4-9. Duro-Bilt refused; however, Duro-Bilt's refusal was not aimed at a condition of the 1995 
Agreement. Duro-Bilt refused to enter into the entirely new agreement, which was outside the scope 
of the I995 Agreement, proposed 9 years after the 1995 Agreement. 
Moreover, the condition and agreement proposed in 2004 conflicts with the express terms of 
the 1995 Agreement. The 1995 Agreement expressly provides for each of the parties to the 1995 
Agreement to have perpetual access to their individual properties from Second and Third Streets via 
the vacated property. Id. at 7 3 .  Plaintiff admits the 1995 Agreement protects each party's need for 
access. Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.), p. 72 11.1-4. The 1995 Agreement contains no mention 
of or any reference to any limitation on the width of each party's access easement or the parties' 
consent to any such limitation. Id. at p. 75 11. 24-25, p. 76 11. 1-2; Complaint Ex. A. Indeed, the 
express contractual provision provides that the parties will have 
a perpetual easement upon vacated First Avenue South for the purpose of access to 
and from their property from both Second and Third Street located in Nampa. The 
actual location of the easement shall be at the discretion of the legal owner of the 
vacated property upon the City's vacation of First Avenue South as described herein. 
Id 
The parties agree that there is no written instrument obligating Duro-Bilt to agree to a limited 
20' access easement. First, the 1995 Agreement clearly provides an easement on the vacated property 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 
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for access to each owner's property located at their discretion -- the purpose for such easement being 
to provide the parties adequate access to and from their property from both Second and Third Streets. 
The 1995 Agreement imposes no limits on the size of each party's access easement. Indeed, no size 
limit was proposed until 2004, when Mr. Wylie circulated aproposed new agreement limiting access 
to only 20'. Limiting the access easement to 20' imposes an obligation outside the scope ofthe 1995 
Agreement. Duro-Bilt did not contract for such limited access by way of the 1995 Agreement. 
Duro-Bilt's refusal to relinquish needed access is consistent with the 1995 Agreement and Idaho law 
governing the vacation of public streets. Section 50-33 1, Idaho Code, prohibits vacations that would 
impair rights-of-ways and easements of any iot owner. Vacating 1" Avenue South with only 20' for 
access, would impair Duro-Bilt's access. 
Even if we assume the parties were still bound by the 1995 Agreement in 2004, Defendant 
did not breach the 1995 Agreement when it refused to agree to the limited 20' access proposed by the 
City Fire Department and Mr. Wylie in 2004. In refusing to agree to the 2004 condition, Duro-Bilt 
acted in accordance with the terms of the 1995 Agreement and Idaho law. 
For the reasons stated herein, Duro-Bilt's refusal to agree to a condition outside the scope of 
the 1995 Agreement and enter into a new agreement in 2004 was fair and reasonable under the terms 
of the 1995 Agreement. Defendant's refusal to relinquish access did not violate, nullify or 
significantly impair any benefit of the 1995 Agreement. Idaho Power Company v. Cogeneration, 
Inc., 134 Idaho at 750. To the contrary, even Plaintiff admits that Duro-Bilt's right to access is in 
fact protected under the 1995 Agreement without any width restriction. Yorgason Aff., Ex. B 
(Conley Tr.), p. 72 11. 1-4, p. 75 11.24-25, p. 76 11. 1-2. If Duro-Bilt had agreed to the vacation being 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 
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approved with only a 20' access easement, its clearly expressed right to access under the f 995 
Agreement would be impaired. Therefore, in refusing to agree to the 2004 condition, Duro-Bilt 
acted fairly and in good faith under the terms of the 1995 Agreement. Yorgason Aff., Ex. A 
(McKnight Tr.), p. 71,l. 25, p. 72,11.. 1-9; Yorgason Aff., Ex. B (Conley Tr.), p. 72 11. 1-4; Jenkins 
v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho 233,243,108 P.3d 380 (2005). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons described in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment and herein, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendant, by refusing 
to agree to the vacation of lSt Avenue South with the limited 20' access easement in 2004, did not 
breach the 1995 Agreement, and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count 1 of 
Plaintiffs Complaint. Even construing the record entirely in Plaintiffs favor, the undisputed facts 
show that even if the 1995 Agreement is valid, Defendant is not in breach of the 1995 Agreement. 
There is no disputed evidence to preclude the grant of summary judgment in Defendant's favor. 
Defendant requests attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 55 12-120 and 12-121. 
DATED this January. 2007. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHTD. 
~ t t o k &  for Defendant Scotty's Duro-Bilt, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 84LL I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this - day of January, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Jon M. Steele - U.S. Mail 
Karl J. F. Runft Hand Delivery 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 - Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runftlaw.com 
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SUSAN E. BUXTON # 4041 
TAMMY A. ZOKAN # 5450 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-1 800 
Facsimile: (208) 33 1-1202 
Email: taz@msbtlaw.com 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK ( P SALAS, DEPUTY - ! 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, 
) 





SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) 





Before the Court is Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
December 26,2006; 
and, the Court having reviewed the relevant pleadings, briefs and memoranda, and having 
considered oral argument, and good cause appearing therefore: 
It is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to the last remaining 
ORDER - I 
000223 
count of Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Count One - Breach of Contract. 
It is krther ORDERED that Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for a Jury 
Trial against Defendant, is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with costs and attorneys fees to be 
addressed separately. 
FEB - 6 2007 
DATED this - day of ,2007. 
By: 
District Judge, Third Judicial District 
ORDER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
n 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 day o d &  2007,I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Jon M. Steele U.S. Mail 
Karl J. F. Runft Hand Delivery 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC - Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Emaii: jmsteele(iilrunftlaw.com 
Tammy A. Zokan U.S. Mail 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE ___ Hand Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 - Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83702 ___ Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 33 1-1202 





I ORDER- 3 
JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele(iilrunftlaw.com 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; 
and DOES I through V. 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 




MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Goodman respectfully requests this Court to reconsider its Order granting 
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Goodman's Complaint alleges breach of the Property Owner's Vacation 
Agreement by Duro-Bilt. Other counts alleging tortious interference with the 
GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement by & Defendants, negligent interference 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
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ORIGINAL 
with prospective economic advantage (the GoodmanIWylie Purchase and Sale 
Agreement) by 4 Defendants and intentional interference with prospective economic 
advantage (the GoodmadWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement) by Defendants were 
previously dismissed by this Court. 
The Court's previous order dismissing McKnights individually was based upon 
the Courts belief that Goodman had failed to present evidence which would justify 
"piercing the corporate veil" of Defendant Duro-Bilt. The Court at that same time 
declined to enter Summary Judgment for Goodman as the Court announced that there 
remained a factual issue as to whether the Properly Owner's Vacation Agreement 
remained in effect. The Court also denied Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion 
based upon their contention that the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement was void. 
In Defendant's Second Summary Judgment Motion Defendant changed legal 
theories. In its Second Summary Judgment Motion they no longer contend the Property 
Owner's Vacation Agreement is void. They now contend that it simply was not ripe for 
enforcement. The Court agreed and in granting Summary Judgment announced that the 
vacation of First Avenue had not been finalized and hence Defendants performance under 
the Vacation Agreement was not ripe. 
In litigation over the past two and one-half (2 K ) years, in this case and the 
companion case before Judge Morfitt, Defendants have contended that the Property 
Owner's Vacation Agreement was void and unenforceable. 
In its first Summary Judgment motion, Duro-Bilt contended (a) that there is no 
valid contract between the parties (p. 12 Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
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Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (b) that the Vacation Agreement lapsed 
due to failure of the vacation (page 12, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); (c) that the Vacation Agreement did not 
contain a contract term and therefore should be deemed to have lapsed (page 13, 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); 
(d) that the Vacation Agreement is invalid for lack of consideration (page 15, 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment); 
and (e) that even if the Vacation Agreement is valid, Duro-Bilt is excused fiom 
performance (page 17, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment). 
However, by switching horses in the middle of the stream, Defendants have now 
convinced this Court to grant Summary Judgment. 
In their first Summary Judgment Motion when Defendants contended the vacation 
was void and unenforceable, this Court ruled that an issue of material fact remained to be 
determined by a jury. That issue was whether the Vacation Agreement was still in effect. 
It is and has been Goodman's contention that not only is the Vacation Agreement 
still in effect, but also that the vacation of First Avenue South is over and final. In 
granting Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court announced that 
the vacation of First Avenue South had not been completed which completely ignores 
Judge Morfitt's ruling in the companion case. 
The granting of Summary Judgment has no basis in the record. In fact, the exact 
opposite is true. Defendants flip-flopping between legal theories creates more issues of 
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material fact. First Avenue South has been vacated. This Court has reviewed Judge 
Morfitt's decisions in the companion case of Goodman v. the City of Nampa, Case No. 
CV 04-10007. In the past thirty (30) days, Judge Morfitt has awarded Goodman $40,000 
in attorney's fees as a result of the Judicial Review portion of its case and has entered a 
Preliminary Injunction against Nampa prohibiting it from proceeding with obtaining 
consents, proceeding or scheduling any public hearing or proceeding in any other manner 
which is consistent with previously obtained consents to vacation and completed vacation 
of First Avenue South between Second and Third Streets South in the City of Nampa. 
See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Defendants Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court has been led astray by Defendants. The time for performance under 
the Vacation Agreement was August of 2004. Defendants' were asked to meet their 
contractual obligations by cooperating and consenting to the vacation of First Avenue 
South. Instead, they refused to cooperate, instigated an illegal veto of Ordinance No. 
3374 and have held the development of this downtown Nampa parcel hostage. 
The exhibits to the Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Goodman's Motion 
for Reconsideration of Order Granting Defendant's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment consist of pleadings &om the companion case before Judge Morfitt: 
Goodman's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order concerning the 
award of fees and costs; Goodman's proposed Judgment as to the Nampa Respondents; 
Goodman's proposed Preliminary Injunction against Nampa Respondents and 
Goodman's Supplemental Brief concerning additional issues Judge Morfitt will be 
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addressing. Even though Defendant contends otherwise, the vacation of First Avenue 
South is h a l .  This Court's ruling that Defendant's time for performance under the 
Vacation Agreement is not ripe is wholly erroneous and not supported by anything in the 
record. 
This litigation is the result of Defendant Duro-Bilt's breach of contract in which it 
consented to the vacation of Fist  Avenue South. That is the starting point. Duro-Bilt's 
breach of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement led to Duro-Bill's and McKnight's 
interference with the Goodman/Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
This entire dispute would never have occurred if Duro-Bilt had abided by the 
contractual terms it agreed to in the Property Owner Street Vacation Agreement. But for 
the breach of that Agreement and McKnight's interdiction of Ordinance No. 3374 the 
GoodmatdWylie Purchase and Sale Agreement would have closed. 
McKnight and the Mayor had been on a ski trip together to Sun Valley in March 
of 2004. Mayor Dale describes McKnight as a fiiend. See, Bates No. 000180. Mayor 
Dale taught McKnight's children at a charter school and McKnight is a member of the 
Board of Directors of that school. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of 
Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Defendant's Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Bates No. Plf 000285 - Plf 000286. 
Defendants admit that they contacted the City and attempted to verbally withdraw 
Duro-Bilt's consent to the Vacation Agreement. See, Complaint para 29 and Answer 
para. 29. Defendants also admit sending a letter to the City attempting to withdraw 
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Defendant's consent to the vacation of First Avenue South. Complaint para. 37 and 
Answer para. 37. 
In his deposition, Mayor Dale confirmed McKnight's material, ex parte contact, 
recalling that "he [McKnight] conveyed to me that, as a property owner on that street, he 
did not agree to the vacation at this time. See, Bates No. 000181. 
After Ordinance No. 3374 had been vetoed, McKnight told Goodman that he 
wished to purchase Goodman's property where the car lot is located. See, Bates No. 
000181. These lots are #I 1 and 12 and are located to the south of Duro-Bilt's lot. 
It is also an undisputed fact that Goodman has suffered an injury as a result of the 
reduced value of the Goodman property. See, Bates Nos. 000246-000247. 
Duro-Bilt, although contractually bound to cooperate and having already 
consented to the street vacation, broke its promises. This conduct was not only a breach 
of the Property Owner's Vacation Agreement, but led to the interference with the 
Goodman1 Wylie Purchase and Sale Agreement. McKnight's undisputed role as 
instigator of Duro-Bilt's refusal to cooperate, the withdrawal of consent and of an illegal 
veto by the Nampa Mayor are more than sufficient to withstand Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Goodman respectfully requests the Court to reconsider its Order. 
DATED this- r$ ay of February, 2007. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
J ~ N  M. ~ T E E L E  
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERM,CE 
re\ 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this day of February 2007, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon opposing counsel as 
follows: 
Tammy Zokan US Mail 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd. 1Personal Delivery 
950 W. Bmock,  Suite 520 - Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteelecii!runftlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. $ALAS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, 
j 
) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
VS. 
) 
) GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and ) SECOND MOTION FOR 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; ) SIJMMARY JUDGMENT 




COMES NOW, Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company by and through its counsel of 
record, Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. I l(a)(2)(B) moves 
I 
I 
this Court to reconsider its Order granting Defendant's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
This Motion is based upoh a Brief in Support of this Motion and Affidavit of Jon 
I M. Steele. 
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
ORIGINAL 
Oral aigument is requested. 
d DATED this 2day of Febmary 2007. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this & day of February 2007, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served upon opposing counsel as 
follows: 
Tammy Zokan - US Mail 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd. &Personal Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 - Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9495 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@runRlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) CASENO. CV 05-9800 
VS. 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN 
) SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) MOTION FOR 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and ) RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
ALANE McKNIGHT, husband and wife; ) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
and DOES I through V, ) SECOND MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada 1 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and 
competent to make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal 
knowledge, states as follows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
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ORIGINAL 
1. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel 
for the Plaintiff herein. 
2. That I make this affidavit in support of Goodman's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Order Granting Defendant's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
3. That attached is a true and correct copy of the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case Goodman v. City of Nampa, 
Canyon County Case No. CV 04-10007, Bates Nos. Plf 000261 - Plf 000265. 
4. That attached is a true and correct copy of the proposed Judgment as to the 
Nampa Respondents, in the case Goodman v. City of Nampa, Canyon County 
Case No. CV 04-10007, Bates Nos. Plf 000266 - Plf000268. 
5. That attached is a true and correct copy of the Preliminary Injunction Against 
Nampa Respondents, in the case Goodman v. City ofNampa, Canyon County 
Case No. CV 04-10007, Bates Nos. Plf 000269 - Plf 000271. 
6. That attached is a true and correct copy of the Goodman's Supplemental 
Brief, in the case Goodman v. City of Nampa, Canyon County Case No. CV 
04-10007, Bates Nos. Plf 000272 - Plf 000284. 
7. That attached is a true and correct copy of an excerpt from the deposition of 
Mayor Tom Date taken April 22,2005, Bates Nos. Plf 000285 - Plf 000286. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
\ ro 
DATED this 2 day of Febnary 2007, 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada 1 
vd 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN unto before me this 23 day of February 2007 
k , 
~ o d y  Public for t ha t a t e  of Idaho 
Residi i  at: U&~I;X~,  
My Commission Expires: 3-\b -0 7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 
rcl The undersigned hereby certified that on this & day of February 2007, a true and 
correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF 
GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served 
upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Tammy Zokan 
Moore Smith 
225 N. 9th, Suite 420 
Boise ID 83702 
-US Mail 
2 Personal Delivery 
- Facsimile 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
- J '  
JON M. STEELE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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JON M. STEELE (ISB # 1911) 
KARL J. F. RUNFT (ISB # 6640) 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: (208) 333-9496 
Fax: (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@,runftlaw.com 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
CITY OF NAMPA, a corporate body politic; 
THE CITY COUNCIL of the CITY OF 
NAMPA; MAYOR TOM DALE, in his 
capacity as Mayor of the City of Nampa; 
DIANA LAMBING, in her capacity as City 
Clerk; and SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT 
GENERATOR, WC., an Idaho corporation, 
) CASE NO. CV 04-10007 
) 
) 
) FINDINGS AND FACT, 










Pending before the Court is the Nampa Respondents Objection to Petitioner 
Goodman Oil Company's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. The Nampa 
Respondents have appeared by and through its attorney of record, Christopher Gabbert, 
and Petitioner appeared by and through its attorneys of record, Jon M. Steele and Karl J. 
F. Runft, and Petitioner having submitted supporting affidavits as required by IRCP 54, 
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the Court having fully reviewed the record and having considered the argument of 
counsel finds the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. In this matter Petitioner brought two separate and distinct actions, the Writ 
of Mandamus Proceeding and the Judicial Review Proceeding. 
2. Considering the final results of these actions in relation to the relief sought 
it is clear that Petitioner is the prevailing party in both the Mandamus 
Proceeding and the Judicial Review Proceeding. 
3. The Court also finds that Petitioner's attorneys aggressively pursued this 
matter and that both parties' attorneys skillfully and appropriately 
represented their client. 
4. The Court also finds that the Petitioner sought leave to perform discovery 
in the Mandamus Proceeding and received this Court's approval. 
Conclusions of Law 
1.  It is the American Rule that each party bear their own attorney fees and 
costs unless a contractual or statutory provision provides otherwise. 
2. The Court concludes that Idaho Code jj 12-1 17 is the exclusive basis for 
the award of attorney fees against the Nampa Respondents in this case. 
See, Westway Construction Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Department, 139 
Idaho 107,73 P.3d 721 (2003). 
3. Idaho Code jj 12-1 17 provides that the Court shall award attorney fees 
when the Court finds the Respondent acted "without a reasonable basis in 
law or fact." 
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4. The Court cannot find that the Nampa Respondents acted without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact in regard to the Mandamus Proceeding. 
5. The Court concludes in regards to the Mandamus Proceeding, that simply 
being wrong does not give rise to acting without a reasonable basis in law 
or fact as required by Idaho Code $12-1 17. 
6. In regards to the Judicial Review Proceeding, the Court found in 
Petitioners favor that the IAPA does not apply and found in Petitioners 
favor on the substantive issue of the resewation of the easement, as being 
a violation of law and an ultra vires act. Black v. Young, 122 Idaho 302, 
834 P.2d 304 (1992). 
7. The Court concludes that the Nampa Respondents acted without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact as to the Judicial Review Proceeding as 
there exists no basis for the resewation of the 50 foot wide easement 
resewed in Ordinance No. 3374 in either law or fact. 
8. Pursuant to Idaho Code 9 12-1 17 Petitioner is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees for only the Judicial Review Proceeding in this case and not 
for the Mandamus Proceeding in this case. 
9. In regards to the question as to what amount is a necessary and proper 
award, the Court has considered the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(c)3. 
10. The amount of an award of attorney fees is committed to the sound 
discretion of this Court. E. Idaho Agric. Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 130 
Idaho 623,944 P.2d 1386 (1997). 
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1 1. The Court concludes that Petitioner is the prevailing party on both the 
Mandamus Proceeding and Judicial Review Proceeding, but that it is 
appropriate to award attorney fees on only the Judicial Review 
Proceeding. 
12. The Court determines that after considering the above, the briefings, the 
affidavits in support and the argument of counsel that it is appropriate to 
award the Petitioner $40,000 as attorney fees for the Judicial Review 
Proceeding of this matter. 
13. The Court also concludes that Petitioner is entitled to $2,966.29 in costs 
claimed as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(c). 
Order -
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner is awarded attorney fees of $40,000 and 
costs of $2,966.29. Judgment against the Nampa Respondents will be entered 
appropriately. 
DATED this day of 2007. 
JUDGE JAMES C. MORFITT 
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Chris D. Gabbert U S  Mail 
White Peterson, P.A. - Personal Delivery 
5700 East Franklin Road, Ste 200 Facsimile 
Nampa ID 83687-7901 
Jon M. Steele - US Mail 
Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC Personal Delivery 
1020 W. Main St. Suite 400 F a c s i m i l e  
Boise, ID 83702 
Clerk of Court 
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This matter having come before the Court and the Petitioner being represented by 
Jon M. Steele and Karl J. F. Ru& and the Nampa Respondents being represented by 
Christopher Gabbert. The Court having previously entered it's Order Granting Writ of 
Mandamus, it's Peremptory Writ of Mandamus and having issued it's 54(b) Certificate, 
all on August 8, 2005. The Ordinance #3374 having been published by the Nampa 
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Respondents on or about September 5, 2005, and the time to appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code 8 50-1322 having expired with no appeal taken, the vacation of First Avenue South 
between 2nd Street South and 3'* Street South in the City of Nampa is final. 
The Court having entered it's Memorandum Decision on Judicial Review and 
Order on November 7, 2006, and issued its Findings and Fact and Conclusion of Law 
Concerning Attorney Fees and Costs on 2007, now enters judgment in 
accordance therewith. 
Now, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. That the 50 foot wide ingress/egress and utility easement reserved by 
O r d i i c e  #3374 which vacated First Avenue South between znd Street South and 31d 
Street South in the City of Nampa is set aside and of no M e r  force or effect. 
2. That Ordinance #3374 be and is hereby, Remanded to the City of Nampa 
for it's determination as to whether other factors existed or regardimg the public good 
requirement of Idaho Code 5 50-3 1 1.  
3. Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-117, Petitioner is awarded attorney fees of 
$40,000.00 and costs as a matter of right of $2,966.29. 
DATED this day of 2007. 
JUDGE JAMES C. MORHTT 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this - day of February 2007, a true 
and correct wpy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AS TO THE NAMF'A RESPONDENTS 
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This Court, on February 2,2007, having heard the Petitioner's Motion for Preliminasy 
Injunction and Petitioner Goodman being represented by Jon M. Steele and the Nampa 
Respondents being represented by Chris Gabbert and the Court having heard and considered orai 
argument of counsel and good cause appearing for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction against 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, P. 1 
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the Nampa Respondents, the Court finds as follows: 
The Nampa Respondents have solicited consents to vacation from adjoining property 
owners of First Avenue South and have scheduled and noticed a public hearing concerning the 
vacation of First Avenue South; 
Such action is inconsistent with and done in violation of Petitioner's rights respecting the 
subject of this litigation, which is the vacation of First Avenue South, and would render this 
Court's judgment ineffectual (see, I.R.C.P. 65(e)3) as valid consents to the vacation of First 
Avenue South have previously been obtained from adjoining property owners and the vacation of 
First Avenue South is completed and is final. 
Now therefore it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a preliminary 
injunction is issued enjoining and restraining the Nampa Respondents, its offices, agents, 
employees and attorneys and those persons in active concert or participation with them who 
receive actual notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise during the pending of this 
action from obtaining any consents, proceeding or scheduling any public hearing, or proceeding in 
any other manner which is inconsistent with previously obtained consents to vacation and 
completed vacation of First Avenue South between 2nd and 3" Streets South in the City of Nampa. 
Petitioner shall post a $500 check payable to the Clerk of this Court as security pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 65(c). 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
DATED this - day of February 2007. 
JUDGE JAMES C. MORFITT 
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Petitioner Goodman Oil ("Goodman") has submitted a detailed summary of the 
factual and procedural posture of this case in Goodman's Memorandum in Support of 
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Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 29,2007, and will rely, in part, 
on that summary for this Supplemental Brief. 
Goodman is submitting this Supplemental Brief in response to the February 2, 
2007, hearing during which this Court heard Goodman's Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification regarding the Court's ruling 
that Ordinance No. 3374 was to be remanded to the Respondent, the City of Nampa 
("Nampa"). The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction and ordered supplemental 
briefing on the following issues: 
1. Is Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration andlor Clarification timely? 
2. The propriety of the Court's remand. Was the remand ever raised as an 
issue on appeal? Was the issue properly before the Court? Did the Court 
act within it's authority in making the remand order? If not, is it still 
proper? 
3. If remand is appropriate, what is the scope of the remand order? What is 
the scope of the "public good"? What evidence may be considered by the 
City in making that determination? 
4. If the Court's remand is set aside, does the Ordinance survive with the 
easement struck? 
5. What effect is the Peremptory Writ of Mandamus in August of 2005 with 
the I.R.C.P. 54(b) Certificate and the effect of no appeal having been taken 
in accordance with Idaho Code 5 50-1322? 
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GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR 
CLARIFICATION WAS TIMELY 
Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification was timely because 
under I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), such a motion may be made at any time during the progress 
of the case until final judgment is entered. In Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 
Idaho 774,785,69 P.3d 1035, 1046 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure specifically 
provides that a motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory 
order of the trial court may be made at any time before entry of 
final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry 
of final judgment. This Court has repeatedly held that I.R.C.P. 
1 l(a)(2)(B) provides a district court with authority to reconsider 
and vacate interlocutory orders so long as final judgment has not 
been entered. Telford v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 932, 950 P.2d 1271 
(1998); Sammis v. Magneiek Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 
3 14, 3 18 (1 997); Farmers Nai'l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 878 
P.2d 762 (1994). 
Final judgment has not been entered in the Judicial Review portion of the case. 
This Court has not entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment as 
to Nampa, both of which were submitted to this Court by Goodman on January 26,2007. 
Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration and for Preliminary Injunction was the 
result of Nampa's unilateral action in setting a public hearing without notifying 
Goodman's attorney. 
The Notice and Hearing were in violation of this Court's Peremptory Writ of 
Mandamus which resulted in the vacation of First Avenue South in September of 2005. 
The Notice states that the purpose of the hearing would be to determine whether First 
Avenue South &g@ be vacated. See, Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in 
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Support of Goodman's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Reconsideration and 
Clarification filed on January 29, 2007. That was not the issue this Court ordered Nampa 
to consider in this Court's remand. This Court directed Nampa to only consider whether 
there were further issues concerning the "public good" regarding the vacation. The 
Notice contemplates a hearing over issues which were not remanded to Nampa, such as 
whether proper consent had been secured among the adjoining property owners. 
Second, the Notice and Hearing are a violation of this Court's Preemptory Writ of 
Mandamus. Under this Court's Preemptory Writ of Mandamus, First Avenue South has 
already been vacated. Nampa is in violation of this Court's Preemptory Writ of 
Mandamus by asserting, via its Notice, that First Avenue South is not vacated and that 
the Preemptory Writ of Mandamus has somehow become void. This Court's Preemptory 
Writ of Mandamus has not become void. It has full force and effect and Nampa threatens 
to violate it. 
Third, the public hearing on this issue has been closed for years. Nampa cannot 
open up the fact finding process again. 
Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration and for Preliminary Injunction was the 
result of Nampa's absurd interpretation of this Court's remand order. The Motion was 
brought within days of Goodman receiving notice of the ill conceived procedure from 
Nampa. Despite repeated requests, Nampa provided no notice of this procedure to 
Goodman's attorney. 
Goodman's motion is timely. 
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THE COURT'S REMAND IS NOT APPROPRIATE 
This Court ordered in the Judicial Review proceeding that the fifty (50') foot wide 
ingresslegress and utility easement reserved by Ordinance No. 3374 was to be set aside 
and of no further force or effect. However, the Court further ordered that Ordinance No. 
3374 was to be remanded to Nampa for a determination as to whether other factors 
existed regarding the "public good" requirement of I. C. § 50-3 11. This is inappropriate 
as it would serve no purpose than to undermine the prior decision of this Court. 
First, the Court has already ruled in its Memorandum and Decision on Judicial 
Review and Order that: 
The Court finds and concludes, as a matter of law, that the City's 
reservation of a 50 foot ingresslegress utility easement is in 
violation of the provisions of I.C. $ 50-3 1 1. 
The Court further finds and concludes that the City's 
reservation of a 50 foot ingresslegress utility easement is an ultra 
vires a d  by the City because the reservation of the easement is in 
conflict with LC. $ 50-3 11. 
See, Memorandum and Decision on Judicial Review and Order, p. 10. 
Nampa has no authority to reserve any easement by way of considering the 
"public good" as Nampa is prohibited from doing so by law and this Court's Order. The 
issue of the "public good" is a prerequisite to vacating a street. See, I.C. $ 50-31 1. As 
this Court knows, by granting Goodman's Preemptory Writ of Mandamus directing 
Nampa to publish Ordinance No. 3374, Ordinance No. 3374 became law. First Avenue 
South was and has been vacated since the issuance of the Preemptory Writ of Mandamus 
and publication of the Ordinance. The underlying property has reverted to its respective 
owners. See, I.C. 50-3 11. As a result of the Court's remand Nampa has unilaterally 
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decided that it is entitled to start the vacation process over again. Goodman is confident 
that this was never intended by this Court. The remand was not intended to allow Nampa 
a chance to nullify the past two and one-half years of litigation and this Court's own 
Preemptory Writ of Mandamus. 
Further. the Court should observe that the issues Goodman raised on review were 
whether the decision to require a twenty (20') foot wide fire access road and the fiRy 
(50') foot wide easement were legitimate. See, Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition 
for Judicial Review, p. 9. Neither Goodman nor Nampa asked this Court to review 
whether Nampa had failed to consider if the vacation was "expedient for the public good" 
in passing Ordinance No. 3374. Indeed, it has always been Goodman's contention that 
when Ordinance No. 3374 was passed Nampa had fulfilled its obligation to consider the 
"public good" pursuant to I.C. $ 50-31 1, but that Nampa had no authority to reserve the 
fifty (50') foot easement as such. Nampa never raised any issue concerning whether it 
had failed to consider what was "expedient for the public good". See, Response to 
Petition for Writ of Mandate and Petition for Judicial Review. 
The issue of whether passage of the Ordinance was done with sufficient 
consideration of the "public good" is and was simply not before this Court. See, I.R.C.P. 
84(d)(5)(statement of issues for judicial review). In an 1.R.C.P 84 review, this Court sits 
as an appellate court according to the cannons of appellate procedure. See, I.R.C.P. 84(r). 
It is a long standing cannon that issues that "have not been raised on appeal ... are not 
before us." Roe v. Doe (In re Termination of the Parental Rights ofDoe), 142 Idaho 174, 
125 P.3d 530 (2005). The Court has no authority to remand the Ordinance on the 
unasserted issue of whether Ordinance No. 3374 is "expedient for the public good." 
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IV. 
THE SCOPE OF THE REMAND ORDER IS AMBIGUOUS 
A dedication of a public street does not convey fee simple title to the public. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has construed a statutory dedication to convey to the public only a 
"defeasible fee", subject to a right of reversion in the owners of the adjacent lots fronting 
upon the vacated street. In the case of Mochel v. Cleveland, 51 Idaho 468, 5 P.2d 549 
(1 930), the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to assess the nature of the reversionary 
interest possessed by the owners of adjacent lots. In that case, the Supreme Court 
considered whether or not a city had authority to convey a fee simple interest in a 
dedicated street to another non-adjoining property owner, or whether the city's ownership 
rights were subject to a right of reversion in the owners of the property fronting upon the 
street. In upholding such right of reversion, the Idaho Supreme Court defined the nature 
of the interest as follows: 
C.S. 5 3963. provides that, when any street, alley, avenue or lane 
shall be vacated, the same shall "revert" to the owner of the 
adjacent real estate . . . The city had title to the lands for public use 
only. When that use was abandoned, what did the legislators have 
in mind other than that the land should "go back" to the dedicator 
or his successors? If the city could deed it to anyone else, there 
could in such instance never be a going back; nothing would 
"revert". 
See Mochel v. Cleveland, 5 P.2d at 553. The court further went on to explain that the 
"fee" interest referred to in the statute is merely a fee interest in the surface of the 
property, or a mere right to use the street for public purposes, and that upon abandonment 
or vacation of the street, the "fee interest" reverts to the owner of the adjoining property 
fronting upon the street: 
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While the word "fee" is used in this section, it is clear from what 
follows that it was not intended that the fee of the corpus or land 
itself should pass, but only the fee to the surface, and this only for 
public use for all purposes of a street or highway. The fee 
mentioned in the statute was thus what is known as a limited or 
determinable fee, and was created for a special purpose or 
purposes only, and hence was subject to abandonment. 
Mochel v. Cleveland, supra, 5 P.2d 553. 
Thus when an owner of property dedicates a street for public use, the public 
entity, as recipient of such dedication, acquires a limited "fee" interest in the surface of 
the property embraced within the dedication, which limited or "defeasible" fee then 
reverts to the owner of the adjacent property upon abandonment of the use of the street by 
the public entity. 
As stated, this Court ordered that Ordinance No. 3374 was to be remanded to 
Nampa for a determination as to whether other factors existed regarding the "public 
good" requirement of I. C. 5 50-3 1 1. I. C. 3 50-3 1 1 lists no factors of what a city should 
considerer when determining if a street vacation is "deemed expedient for the public 
good." See, I. C. 5 50-3 11. However, in light of the Mochel case it is apparent that once 
the purpose of the street right of way no longer exists the public entity has the power to 
abandon the street for the "public good". 
In the case of Tott v. Sioux City, 261 Iowa 677,680, 155 N.W.2d 502,505 (1968), 
the Supreme Court of Iowa stated: 
a wide discretion is vested in cities and towns in the opening, 
control and vacation of streets and alleys. While the exercise of 
this power is not unlimited, yet where it is exercised in good faith, 
and for what it believes to be the public good, the courts will not 
interfere in the action of the municipality. Such interference is 
justified only in a clear case of arbitrary and unjust exercise of the 
power. 
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In abandoning a street for the "public good" a city may not be arbitrary or unjust. 
Goodman would like to note this Court has already ruled that Nampa acted arbitrarily in 
reserving the fifiy (50') foot easement in Ordinance No. 3374. 
Finally, as stated above, consideration of the "public good" is a prerequisite for 
vacating a street. Any issue of whether vacating First Avenue South is "expedient for the 
public good" was determined when Ordinance No. 3374 was passed by the Nampa City 
Council and signed by the Mayor. 
ORDINANCE NO. 3374 SURVIVES WITH THE EASEMENT 
STRUCK IF THE COURT'S REMAND IS SET ASIDE 
Under Black v. Young, 122 Idaho 302, 834 P.2d 304 (1992), this Court is well 
within its power to strike the easement and allow Ordinance No. 3374 to stand. As this 
Court may recall, in Black, builders were granted a vacation of an alley upon the 
condition that the builders get a building permit and proper funding to build a hotel; the 
builders objected to the conditions. Id. at 304-305, 834 P.2d at 306-307. The Supreme 
Court struck the conditions but then remanded the ordinance because: 
Section 1 of Ordinance Number 471 states that "it is found by the 
Ketchum City Council to be in the best interest of the City of 
Ketchum and for the public good and convenience, provided fhat 
the motel. . . is built, that said portion of said alley hereinafter be 
vacated." (Emphasis added.) The only "public good" found by the 
City of Ketchum in Ordinance Number 471 was the construction of 
the motel. 
So, the City of Ketchum found that it was expedient for the public 
good to vacate the alley ifthe motel was built. Additionally, the 
parties do not dispute that the public good requirement would be 
satisfied by construction of the motel. In fact, in the estoppel 
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affidavit, the Blacks acknowledged that "[wle understand the City 
of Ketchurn has determined that, provided the motel is constructed, 
the alley is not needed as a public thoroughfare." The problem, 
then, with striking only the two conditions and the right of 
reversion from the ordinance is that the statutorily mandated 
finding of "expedient for the public good" would be defeated. 
However, we are unable to discern, from this record, whether there 
was some other independent basis for the public good requirement. 
For this reason, we reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand the case to the trial court to determine if other factors 
existed or were considered regarding the public good requirement 
of1.C. $ 50-311. 
Id. at 309,834 P.2d at 3 1 l(footnote omitted). 
In this case, unlike in Black, the reservation of the fifty (50') foot easement in 
Ordinance No. 3374 was nowhere explicitly stated to have been reserved out of concern 
for the "public good." It is obvious from the record that this easement was reserved 
arbitrarily and out of an erroneous interpretation of I. C. $ 50-3 11. Thus, the easement 
was not reserved as a prerequisite to vacation like the condition to build the hotel in Black 
was. Additionally, the statute itself reserves an easement for any lot owner or public 
utility as does the Property Vacation Agreement between the adjacent property owners. 
Therefore, the Court may strike the easement without compromising the affect of 
Ordinance No. 3374 
VI. 
NAMPA FAILED TO TIMELY APPEAL THE 
PREEMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE 
This Court attached an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate to the Preemptory Writ of 
Mandamus. Additionally, no appeal was taken pursuant to I.C. $ 50-1322, which allows 
any aggrieved person to appeal within twenty (20) days of publication of an ordinance 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - Page 10 
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vacating a right of way. As no timely appeal was taken from this Court's issuance of the 
Writ of Mandamus, it is conclusive that First Avenue South has been vacated and title has 
vested in the respective adjoining owners. Those owners include Goodman, Duro-Bilt, 
T.J. Forest, Inc. and Blamires. 
A peremptory writ of mandate is a final appealable judgment. See, I.A.R. 1 l(a)l. 
Any order issued with a I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate is a final appealable order. See, I.A.R. 
ll(a)3. The vacation of First Avenue South is final. Nampa is bound by that 
determination. Res judicata or claim preclusion (see, Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 
78 P.3d 379 (2003) and the law of the case (see, Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 5 
P.3d 973 (2000) are additional reasons Nampa is bound to this result. 
This Court cannot reverse that fact by remanding the case to Nampa. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
In a street vacation proceeding, a city cannot place conditions on the vacation of 
a street but may decide not to vacate a street if it is not "expedient for the public good." 
The reservation of the fifty (50') foot easement was not done by Nampa out of 
consideration of the "public good" but out of an arbitrary and erroneous interpretation of 
LC. § 50-311. This Court was correct in striking the reserved easement and must let 
Ordinance No. 3374 stand in full effect as vacating First Avenue South. No timely 
appeal was made from this Court's issuance of the Preemptory Writ of Mandamus. And 
thus any additional consideration of the "public good" would contradict this Court's 
Preemptory Writ. 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - Page 1 1 
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DATED this 23rd day of February 2007. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAWOFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
Attorney for Petitioner 
/"' 
By: 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 23rd day of February 2007, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF was served upon opposing 
counsel as follows: 
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White Peterson, P.A. 2 Personal Delivery 
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1 Q. Can you tell me what you did that 
2 weekend? 
3 A. Skied. 
4 Q. There wasn't any meeting or any 
5 convention or no seminars going on? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Simply pleasure? 
8 A. Right. 
9 Q. Is that the only time you've skied with 
10 Mr. McKnight7 
11 A. That's the only time I skied with 
12 Mr. McKnight. 
13 Q. Did you instruct Mr. McKnight's children 
14 when you were a band instructor at Liberty Charter? 
15 A. I think I had -- I think his son played 
16 drums or something like that, I think. 
17 Q. So you had his son in your class? 
18 A. I think so, yeah. 
19 Q. Do you know his wife Alane McKnight? 
20 A. I don't know her. 
21 Q. Mr. McKnight was on the board of 
22 directors ofthe Liberty Charter School, do you 
23 recall that? 
24 A. Yeah, I know he's on the board. 
25 Q. Was he on the board while you were 
P a g e  10 
1 employed there? 
2 A. 1 assume so. 
3 Q. Were you ever on the board of the 
4 Liberty Charter School? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you ever participate in any board of 
7 directors' meetings at Liberty Charter? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Do you recall who signed your paycheck 
10 at Liberty Charter? 
11 A. I assume it was the superintendent, 
12 Becky Stallcop. I never really looked at it. 
13 Q. Okay. I think Mr. McKnight mentioned 
14 one or two other instances where he may have 
15 encountered you during the past 20-some years. Do 
16 you recall any other times7 
37 A. Well, I'm sure I have run into him 
18 around town, but there was -- that's about it. 
19 Q. I think he mentioned Parade America and 
20 the Stampede? 
21 A. I am sure we ran into each other during 
22 those events. he's civic minded and I'm civic 
23 minded. 
24 Q. Mr. McKnight also mentioned a charter 
25 school organization that he's the vice-president 
4/22/2005 
I J  
Tom Dale 
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1 in. Do you know what that would be7 
2 A. I'm not aware ofthat, what that would 
3 be. 
4 Q. Do you know anything about there is an 
5 investigation into the finances of Liberty Charter 
6 School? Do you know anything what's going on 
7 there? 
8 MR. HALLAM. Object to the form. 
9 MR. STEELE: You can answer the question. 
10 THE WITNESS: Only what I have read in the 
11 newspaper. 
12 Q. BY MR. STEELE: What is that? 
13 A. That there is an investigation, some 
14 people have questioned. That's all 1 know. I 
15 don't pay a whole lot of attention to that. 
16 Q. Do you go to the same church as 
17 Mr. McKnight7 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Do you go the same church as Mr. Holm, 
20 the planning director? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. lf 1 recall, Mr. McKnight said that 
23 Mr. Holm and he went to the same church. Does that 
24 sound right to you? 
25 A. I'm not aware of that at all. 
P a g e  12 
1 Q. Prior to being elected mayor, you were a 
2 city councilman? 
3 A. uh-huh. 
4 Q. How long were you a city councilman? 
5 A. Six years. 
6 Q. You're civic minded. Have you sewed on 
7 boards or committees here locally or other places7 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. So your election to the city council was 
10 your first civic involvement7 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. During your time on the city council and 
13 mayor, do you have any idea how many street 
14 vacation issues have come before you? 
15 MR. HALLAM: Object to the form. Overbroad. 
16 THE WITNESS: No. 
17 Q. BY MR. STEELE: We know at least one. 
18 Would it be more than ten? 
19 A. I don't have a good enough memory to 
20 recall that. 
21 Q. When the city council handles street 
22 vacations, planning and zoning matters, usually the 
23 matter has been reviewed by your s t a e  is that 
24 right? 
25 MR. HALLAM: Are you talking about his 
3 ( P a g e s  9 to 12) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
1 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV 05-9800 
) 
v. ) 
) DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
INC., and Idaho corporation; and DOES I ) FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR 
through V. ) RECONSIDERATION 
1 
Defendant. 
COME NOW, Defendants Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc. ("Duro-Bilt" or "Defendants"), 
by and through their attorneys of record, Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, and submit 
their Response in Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's February 9, 
2007, Order. Defendants' Response is supported by this Response and the pleadings and supporting 
documents filed by Defendants in this matter. 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 
Page 1 
I. SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges Defendants breached the 1995 Agreement by failing to (1) 
consent to the Agreement; (2) grant and convey a perpetual easement on the vacated street; (3) 
cooperate to meet purpose of Agreement; (4) execute a formal agreement recognizing the parties' 
rights and obligations related to the vacated street; (5) share in the maintenance of the vacated street; 
bind itself and successors; (6) act in good faith. Complaint 148. According to Plaintiff's Complaint, 
Defendants breached the 1995 Agreement in its entirety. Id. 
Defendants moved for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the 1995 Agreement was not 
valid in 2004 and even if it was valid in 2004, Defendants had not breached any duty of immediate 
performance under the 1995 Agreement. See Defs' Memo in Support of Summary Judgment (filed 
June 16, 2006) at pp. 7, 17. The Court determined that there was a factual question regarding the 
validity of the 1995 Agreement in 2004 and denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Defendants then filed a Second Motion for S m a r y  Judgment on the grounds that even if 
the 1995 Agreement was valid in 2004, Defendants had not breached any duty due under the 1995 
Agreement. See Defs' Memorandum in Support of Defs' Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
(filed December 26,2006). The Court determined that if the 1995 Agreement was valid in 2004, 
Defendants did not fail to perform any contractual obligation ripe for performance at the time of the 
alleged breach; and, therefore Defendants did not breach the 1995 Agreement as alleged by Plaintiff. 
The Court entered its Order granting Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment on 
February 9, 2007. Plaintiff served its Motion for Reconsideration of that Order on February 23, 
2007. 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 
Page 2 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration does not assert newly discovered facts or any change 
in the law as a basis for Plaintiffs request that this Court reconsider its Order dismissing Plaintiffs 
contract claim. Plaintiff has provided no factual or legal basis for reconsideration of the Court's 
Order and Plaintiffs Motion should be denied. 
11. ARGUMENT 
The Ninth Circuit's treatment of motions for reconsideration is instructive: "A motion for 
reconsideration . . . should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district 
court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or where there is an 
intervening change in the law." McDowell v. Caleron, 197 F.3d 1253 (9' Cir. 1999) (citations 
omitted). (In federal court there is no specific rule motions for reconsideration and such motions 
may be evaluated under Fed. R.Civ. Pro. 59(e) motion to alter or amend, or 60(b) motion for relief 
from judgment.) There are no highly unusual circumstances warranting reconsideration of the Order 
entered in this case. 
There is no basis to reconsider the Court's Order dismissing Plaintiffs contract claim. 
Plaintiff has not submitted new evidence in support of its Motion for Reconsideration. "When 
considering a motion [pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B)], the trial court should take into account any 
new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness of the interlocutory order. The 
burden is on the moving party to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts." Coeur D illene 
Mining Co. v. First National Bank ofNorth Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 821, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990); 
Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57,64,72 P.3d 897 (2003) ("without supporting affidavits, there was no 
basis for asking the trial court to reconsider its earlier decision"). The Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSDERATION - 
Page 3 
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Support of Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration does not present facts relevant to this case. Mr. 
Steele's Affidavit merely submits Goodman's proposed Findings and Judgment and Order in its 
litigation against the City of Narnpa. Affidavit at 77 3-4. The documents are not relevant to this case 
and should be ignored. Moreover, the documents are not law. They are not signed by the Judge or 
file-stamped by the Court. Judge Morfitt's November 7,2006, Order in Plaintiffs case against the 
City of Nampa speaks for itself and it has not been appealed. See Zokan Aff., Ex. A (filed Dec. 26, 
2006). (Goodman has sewed Defendants with untimely Motions for Reconsideration in the City of 
Narnpa case pending before Judge Morfitt.) 
All Plaintiff has done is restate its allegations against Defendants and attempt to muddy the 
waters with draft documents from another case that are not relevant to this case. Plaintiff still has not 
presented any facts showing breach of contractual duty ripe for performance at the time of the 
alleged breach. Plaintiff has once again failed to meet the basic requirements for reconsideration of 
a court decision and Plaintiffs Motion should be denied. 
111. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration should be denied, the Court's Order dismissing 
Plaintiffs contract claim affirmed, and Defendants should be awarded attorney fees and costs 
incurred in responding to Plaintiffs Motion in accordance with Code $ 5  12-120 and 12-121. 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2007. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
c-' 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2"* day of March, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONSE by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Jon M. Steele - U.S. Mail 
Karl J. F. Run8 & Hand Delivery 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC Overnight Mail 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Facsimile (208) 343-3246 
Email: jmsteele@,mnftlaw.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and 
ALANE MCKNIGHT, husband and wife; 
and DOES I through V. 
Defendants. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
) 
) OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIJCE 
) AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO 
) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
) AND COSTS AND REPLYS TO 
) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
) OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff Goodman Oil Company by and through its counsel of record, Runft 
& Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and objects to Defendant's Motion to Strike and Replys to Defendant's 
Response Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs and 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLANTIFF'S 
FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 1 
000271 ORIGINAL 
F 
\ t i i 
Replys to Defendant's Response in Objection to Plaintiffs February 23, 2007 Motion for 
Reconsideration: 
BACKGROUND 
Although Defendant's Certificate of Service lists February 7'h as the date of hand delivery 
to Goodman of McKnight's Amended Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees, Affidavit of 
Zokan in Support of Amended Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs, and McKnight's Brief 
in Support of Amended Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees, these pleadings are stamped 
as received by Goodman on February 8,2007. 
On February 9,2007, this Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment to Duro-Bilt was 
filed. The Order was received by Goodman on February 12,2007. 
On February 23,2007, Goodman filed the following: 
1. Goodman's Renewed Objection to Defendant Bart and Alane McKnight's 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees Dated September 19,2006; and 
Objection to Defendant McKnights' Amended Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees Dated February 7,2007, and Objection to Duro-Bilt's Memorandum 
of Costs and Attorneys Fees Dated February 7,2007; 
2. Brief in Support of Goodman's Objection to Defendant's Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorneys Fees; 
3. Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting Defendant's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 2 
000z;';Z 
4. Brief in Support of Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting 
Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment; 
5. Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support of Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of 
Order Granting Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment.. 
Defendants contend that Goodman's Objection to their Memorandum of Attorneys Fees 
and Costs is tardy. Goodman contends that its objections are timely. Goodman also contends that 
their exists no basis for an award of attorneys fees and costs to Defendants and that, additionally, 
this Court should grant Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of its grant of Summary Judgment 
to Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
In the typical situation where the judgment awards costs and the prevailing party files a 
memorandum of costs seeking attorney fees, the losing party will file an objection. The court 
must then follow the procedure outlined in Rule 54(d)(6), determine which of the items claimed 
will be allowed, and decide the amount of the award. After making this decision, the court can 
enter a supplemental order stating the precise amount awarded. See, e.g., St. John v. O'Reilly, 80 
Idaho 429,333 P.2d 467 (1958). 
In this case, Defendants served their Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs on 
February 7& according to the Certificate of Service, or on February 8& according to Goodman's 
received stamp. 
However, the Order of February 9&, which was received by Goodman on February 12", 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 3 
states that costs and attorneys fees will be addressed separately. 
Pursuant to the Court's Order, Goodman had fourteen (14) days from February 12Ih to file 
its Objection to Attorneys Fees and Costs and its Motion for Reconsideration, or February 26' 
Goodman's Objection and Motion were filed on February 231d 
As noted above, typically a judgment awardiig costs and fees is entered prior to a pasty 
filing its Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs. And in this case, Duro-Bilt forwarded such 
a Judgment to the Court. Yet, Duro-Bilt did not wait until the Court had executed and filed the 
Judgment, but prematurely filed its claim for attorneys fees and costs. 
Goodman's objection to Duro-Bilt's claim for fees and costs consists of a renewed 
objection which was originally filed September 19,2006. There can be no question as to the 
timeliness of this objection. 
Goodman's fourteen (14) day period to object did not begin until it had received the 
decision of this Court, February 12', as a claim for attorneys fees and costs is premature until "a 
decision of the court. .." as provided by I.R.C.P. 54(d)5 is entered. 
As there is no basis for an award of attorneys fees or costs to Defendants, this Court 
should deny Defendant's claim. See, Goodman's Renewed Objection to Defendant's 
Memorandum of Attorneys Fees, filed February 23,2007. Goodman also respectfully requests 
this Court to reconsider its award of Summary Judgment to Defendant Duro-Bilt. 
In it's ruling at the hearing on Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Court reasoned that the time for performance under the Vacation Agreement was not "ripe" 
Clearly, the Court's reasoning is in error. The time for Defendant's performance was August of 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 4 
2004, prior to the vacation of First Avenue South. 
This Court is also in error to believe that First Avenue South has yet to be vacated. The 
Court reached this conclusion at the urging of Defendant. However, First Avenue South has been 
vacated. See, Affidavit of Jon M. Steele in Support filed herewith. 
There simply is no basis in law or fact for this Court's granting of Defendant's Second 
Summary Judgment Motion nor for an award of any attorneys fees or costs to Defendants. 
Goodman requests the Court withdraw its granting of Summary Judgment to Defendants 
and schedule this case for trial. 
DATED this @day of March 2007. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 
JON M . \ S T ~ E ~ E  
~ttorney' for Petitioner 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSLDERATION, P. 5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.tt, 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this day of March 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM 
TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
was served upon opposing counsel as follows: 
Tammy Zokan ~ U S M ~  
Moore Smith Buxton & Turke, Chtd. Personal Delivery 
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520 Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Petitioner 
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, P. 6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAT, DISTRICT OF 
THX STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
GOODMAN OIL COMPANY, ) CASE NO. CV 05-9800 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SCO'MY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, 
INC., an Idaho corporation; BART and 
ALANE McKNIGHT, husband and wife; 
and DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN 
) SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO 
) MOTION TO STRIKE AND REPLY 
) MEMORANDUMTO 
) DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS 
) FEES AND COSTS AND REPLYS 
) TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN 
) OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
) FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
COMES NOW, Jon M. Steele, being over the age of eighteen years and 
competent to make this Affidavit, after first being duly sworn, and upon his own personal 
knowledge, states as foliows: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE N OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FEBRUARY 23,2007 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - Page 1 
ORIGINAL 
1. That I am an attorney in good standing with the Idaho State Bar and counsel 
for the Plaintiff herein. 
2. That I make this affidavit in support of Plaintiffs Objection to Motion to 
Strike and Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Response Memorandum in 
Support Of Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs and Replys to 
Defendant's Response in Objection to Plaintiff's February 23, 2007 Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
3. That attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of Goodman's 
Memorandum Response to Nampa's Motion for Reconsideration Regarding 
this Court's award of Attorney's Fees to Goodman and in Reply to Nampa's 
Opposition to Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration Regarding This Court's 
Denial of Attorney Fees in the Mandamus Proceeding in Goodman Oil 
Company v. City of Nampa, Case No. CV-04-10007, filed March 12,2007. 
Further, your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 12th day of March 2007 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
By: 4 dd 
JON M STEELE 
Attorne for Plaintiff 
AFFIDAVIT OF JON M. STEELE IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MOTION TO 
STRIKE AND REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS AND REPLYS TO DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OBJECTION TO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
Petitioner, 
VS.  
CITY OF NAMPA, a corporate body politic; 
THE CITY COUNCIL of the CITY OF 
NAMPA, MAYOR TOM DALE, in his 
capacity as Mayor of the City of Nampa; 
DIANA LAMBING, in her capacity as City 
Clerk; and SCOTY'S DURO-BET 
GENERATOR, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
Respondents. 
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) CASE NO. CV 04-10007 
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) RECONSIDERATION REGARDING THIS 
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COMES NOW the Petitioner Goodman Oil, by and through its attorneys of record Jon M. 
Steele and Karl J. F. Runft, in response toNampa's Motion for Reconsideration regarding this Court's 
GOODMAN'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO NAMPA'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION REGARDING THIS COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
GOODMAN AND IN REPLY TO NAMPA'S OPPOSITION TO GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION lUX.?ARI)NG 'IBIS COURT'S DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THE 
EXHIBIT -!
award of attorney's fees to Goodman in regards to the Judicial Review Proceeding and also in reply to 
Nampa's Opposition to Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's denial of attorney fees 
as to the Mandamus Proceedings, submits the following: 
BACKGROUND 
This Court has presided over two and one-half (2 %)years of litigation in this case. The Court 
has several motions and issues before it. They include the following: 
1. Goodman's Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the Court's Order 
of November 7,2006, filed January 29,2007. 
2. Goodman's Motiorl for Reconsideration of the Court's Order that Goodman is 
not entitled to attorney's fees for prevailing in the Mandamus portion of this 
case and the Court's Order that the parties enter into mediation, filed February 
3. Additional issues addressed in the Supplemental Briefing ordered by this 
Cou$ filed February 23,2007. 
4. Goodman's Motion for Entry of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Proposed Judgment and Proposed Preliminary Injunction, filed February 
28,2007, and Nampa's Objections, filed March 7,2007. 
5. Nampa's Motion for Reconsideration Regarding the Court's Award of 
Attorney's Fees in the amount of $40,000 to Goodman, filed March 7,2007. 
GOODMAN'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO NAMPA'S MOTION FOR 
 CONSIDERATION REGARDING THIS COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
GOODMAN AND IN REPLY TO NAMPA'S OPPOSITION TO GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
  CONSIDERATION REGARDING THIS COURT'S DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THE 
This Memorandum is in response to Nampa's Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's 
award of $40,000 in attorney fees to Goodman and in reply to Nampa's Opposition to Goodman's 
Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order denying Goodman its attorney fees in the 
Mandamus Proceeding. 
As the Court recalls, Goodman prevailed in the Mandamus Proceeding and on August 22, 
2005, filed its Memorandum of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Goodman claimed attorney fees of 
$71,760 and costs as a matter of right of $2,687.24, a total of $74,447.24. 
At the hearing on January 18,2007, the Court awarded Goodman $40,000 as attorney fees and 
$2,966.29 in costs for the Judicial Review portion of this litigation and denied Goodman's claim for 
attorney fees and costs in the Mandamus Proceeding. 
Goodman has respectfully requested the Court to reconsider its Order denying fees in the 
Mandamus Proceeding. Goodman contends that Nampa had no reasonable basis in law or fact to veto 
Ordinance No. 3374 and that no basis in law or fact existed to reserve a fifty (50') foot wide easement 
and that fees and costs should be awarded pursuant to LC. 3 12-1 17. This Court should award 
Goodman attorney fees and costs pursuant to LC. § 12-121, as Nampa's defense has been and 
continues to be fiivoIous, unreasonable and without foundation. Additionally, this Court should 
award fees pursuant to LC. 7-312 and I.R.C.P. 74(d). 
11. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court should not get caught up in the morass of issues which Nampa continues to bring 
GOODMAN'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO NAMPA'S MOTION FOR 
-CONSIDERATION REGARDING THIS COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
GOODMAN AND IN REPLY TO NAMPA'S OPPOSITION TO GOODMAN'S MOTION FOR 
-CONSIDERATION REGARDING THIS COURT'S DENIAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN THE 
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before this Court. This case is over. Ordinance No. 3374 is law. First Avenue South is vacated. The 
easement is struck. Find judgment should be entered. Nampa has lost. Nampa continues to assert 
issues which have already been resolved. Nampa's defense in this case has been based upon volume. 
There has been no substance to the issues or defenses asserted by Nampa from the very beginning of 
this case. As a government agency, Nampa has the luxury of unlimited public funds to oppose 
Goodman. 
Nampa's contentions, from the very beginning of this case, have been frivolous, unreasonable 
and without foundation, and as the Court recalls, the record is replete with legal and factual 
contentions made by Nampa that have no basis in fact or law. They include the following: 
a. Namva's pre-litigation conduct with no reasonable basis in law or fact: 
1. Ordinance No. 3374 in its original form (as proposed and read twice in 
1995) had no reserved easement. With no advance notice to adjoining 
property owners, Ordinance No. 3374, when passed, reserved a fifty (50') 
foot wide easement. 
2. The Nampa Fire Department's request of a twenty (20') foot wide access 
was treated as a condition of approval despite the fact that the Fire 
Department has no such authority. 
3. The Nampa Fire Department's request of a twenty (20') foot wide access 
was not necessary as Idaho Code 9 50-3 1 1 reserves existing easements and 
accesses and the Vacation Agreement among the adjoining property 
owners provides for cross-easements. 
GOODMAN'S MEMORANDUM RESPONSE TO NAMPA'S MOTION FOR 
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4. Once Ordinance No. 3374 passed, the Mayor's exparte contact with Bart 
McKnight, an adjoining property owner, was a violation of due process as 
the fact finding process had been closed. 
5. After, and despite the fact that the vacation was approved by the adjoining 
property owners, the Nampa Planning Department, the Nampa City 
Council, the Mayor and delivered to the City Clerk for publication, Mayor 
Dale volunteered to veto Ordinance No. 3374 when Bart McKnight 
contacted him. 
6. The Mayor did not disclose to anyone, until deposed, that Bart McKnight 
was his friend, that they had been on a ski trip together to Sun Valley, and 
that the Mayor had been McKnight's children's teacher. 
7. Mayor Dale both approved and vetoed Ordinance No. 3374, a violation of 
Idaho Code $9 50-61 1,50-3 11 and due process. 
8. The Mayor's veto, which had no factual or legal basis, is the only veto in 
at least the past 27 years. 
9. The Mayor made no attempt to explain or justify his veto to the City 
Council or to Goodman. 
10. Goodman's attempts to resolve Narnpa's errors in the vacation process 
without litigation were rebuffed. 
1 1. Nampa made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
12. See also, 1-12, at pages 8 & 9, of this Memorandum, Section a, Judicial 
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development plans, Nampa contended that the Fire Department had 
authority to require an easement. 
6 .  Despite Idaho Code fi 50-3 1 I which does not allow any conditions to be 
imposed upon a street vacation, Nampa contended otherwise. 
7. Despite Idaho Code fi 50-61 1 which provides a mayor may approve 3 
veto an Ordinance (not both), Nampa still contends that the Mayor's veto 
was proper. 
8. Despite the fact that Goodman's president was deposed for over 5 hours, 
neither the deposition nor the documents required to be produced by 
Goodman have ever been cited by Nampa. 
9. Nampa's contention that Goodman was estopped was totally without 
merit. 
10. Nampa repeatedly contended that the Administrative Procedure Act 
applied despite this Court's ruling to the contrary, twice. 
1 1. Nampa continues to assert issues which have already been resolved. 
a) Nampa now contends that Idaho Code fi 50-3 11 is archaic. 
b) Nampa now contends that Idaho case law had not decided the 
issue of whether a mayor could veto an ordinance after it was 
approved, despite the clear language of Idaho Code fi 50-61 1 and 
due process. 
c) Nampa now contends that the Nampa City Code trumps Idaho 
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Code 50-61 1. 
c. Judicial Review Proceeding Conduct that was Frivolous, U~easonabie and 
Without Foundation: 
1. Despite the fact that Idaho Code § 50-3 1 1 reserves a statutory easement, 
Nampa reserved an easement in Ordinance No. 3374. 
2. Despite the fact that the Vacation Agreement provides for cross easements 
among adjoining property owners, Nampa reserved an easement in 
Ordinance No. 3374. 
3. Despite the fact that Nampa's own building review process provides 
Nampa the opportunity to review development plans and at that time 
require, if necessary, an appropriate easement, Nampa reserved an 
easement in Ordinance No. 3374. 
4. Despite the fact that the power to reserve an easement can neither be 
implied eom the language of Idaho Code § 50-31 1 nor is a reserved 
easement essential to the vacation, Nampa contended otherwise. 
5. Despite the fact that the record, consisting of hundreds of pages, contains 
no reference to the reservation of any easement, Nampa contended 
otherwise. 
6. The fifty (50') foot wide easement was added to OrdinanceNo. 3374 after 
the public hearings were closed. This was never addressed by Nampa. 
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7. The resewed easement arbitrarily burdened property owners on the west 
side of First Avenue South in that it is over the westerly fifty (50') feet of 
the vacated property. This was never addressed by Nampa. 
8. Treating owners on the west side of the vacated street different than 
owners on the east side of the street is a violation of due process and equal 
protection. This was never addressed by Nampa. 
9. The resewed fifty (SO') foot wide easement is ten (10') feet wider than the 
actual constructed street which is forty (40') feet. This was never 
addressed by Nampa. 
10. The practical effect of the resewed easement was to render over seventeen 
thousand, five hundred (1 7,500) square feet unbuildable. This was never 
addressed by Nampa. 
1 1. The easement resewed by Nampa was an u h a  vires act. 
12. The resewed easement was not essential to the purpose and completeness 
of Ordinance No. 3374. 
13. The striking of the resewed easement does not undermine any finding of 
the "public good". 
14. Nampa has never contended that there existed an issue concerning the 
"public good". 
15. Nampa now contends that Idaho Code $ 40-1324(I) governs vacation 
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procedure. 
16. Nampa now contends that Ordinance No. 3374 is void. 
17. Nampa now contends that the last 2 !h years of litigation was just practice 
or a wann up for the real vacation process. 
Idaho Code 8 12-1 17 provides: "In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties . . . a city.. . and a person, the court award the person reasonable attorney fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds in favor of the person and also finds that the 
. . . city.. . acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The statute is not discretionary but provides 
that the court must award attomey fees where a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact 
or law in a proceeding involving a person who prevails in the action. See, Rep '1 of Finance v. 
I 
Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282,284,l P.3d 783,785 (2000). As previously explained by 
I the Supreme Court, one of the purposes of this section is to provide a remedy for persons who have 
borne unfair and unjustified financial burden attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never 
have made. Bogner v. State Dep't ofRevenue & ~axafion, 107 Idaho 854,859,693 P.2d 1056,1061 
(1984). The appellate court exercises free review over the decision of a district court applying LC. § 
12-117. See. Id 
This Court is presented the same circumstances as found in Fischer v. City of Ketchurn, 141 
Idaho 349,109 P.3d 1091 (2005). In Fischer the city ignored the plain language of its own ordinance. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated that "[tlhe City had no authority to enact an ordinance inconsistent 
with I.C. 8 67-6512" and awarded Fischer fees pursuant to LC. 3 12-1 17. 
Likewise in this case Nampa had no authority to veto Ordinance No. 3374 or to include the 
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resewed easement. Under these circumstances this Court is required to award Goodman its attorney 
fees and costs for both the Mandamus and Judicial Review Proceedings. See, Musser v. Higginson: 
The Standards for Awarding Attorney Fees Against a State Agency, 32 Idaho 437 at 453-454 (1 996). 
This Court, as an alternative, may also base its award upon Nampa's frivolous, unreasonable 
and unfounded defense. Nampa's latest contentions show no understanding or respect for the work of 
this Court in resolving this litigation. The Court should also award attorney fees and costs to 
Goodman pursuant to LC. $ 7-312 and I.R.C.P. 75(d). 
Lastly Nampa, in complete disregard of this Court's ruling in the Mandamus Proceeding, 
scheduled, with no notice to Goodman's attorneys, a public hearing on the vacation of First Avenue 
South. That conduct required this Court to enter its Preliminary Injunction on February 2, 2007. 
This Court may recall Nampa's comments in the last attomey fee hearing that Goodman "may 
have won the battle, but lost the war." It is this arrogance that requires this Court to award attomey 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code 88 12-1 17, 12-121, LC. § 7-312 and I.R.C.P. 75(d). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm its earlier award of attorney fees and costs and award an 
additional $71,760 as attorney fees and costs of $2,687.24. This Court should bring this litigation to a 
conclusion. 
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b. Mandamus Proceeding Conduct that was Frivolous, Unreasonable and Without 
Foundation: 
1. Despite the fact that all adjoining property owners had entered into a 
Vacation Agreement, the original of which is in the Nampa Planning 
Department's file, Nampa contended that consent had not been obtained. 
2. Despite the fact that Norm Holm, Nampa's Planning Director of 27 years, 
testified that the street vacation application had not lapsed, Nampa 
contended that it had. 
3. Despite the fact that Mr. Holm, Nampa's Planning Director of 27 years, 
testified that the Vacation Agreement was far more thorough and detailed 
than he required, Nampa contended that the Vacation Agreement was 
void. 
4. Despite the fact that the Nampa Planning Department, the City Council 
and the Mayor approved Ordinance No. 3374 and OrdinanceNo. 3374 has 
been published, Nampa still contends First Avenue South has not been 
vacated. 
5. Despite Idaho Code § 50-31 1 which reserves existing easements and 
despite the Vacation Agreement which provides for consent and cross 
easements among the adjoining property owners, and despite Narnpa's 
own planning process which provides for review and approval of all 
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DATED this 12th day of March 2007. 
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SCOTTY'S DURO-BILT GENERATOR, ) 
INC.; and DOES I through V. ) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
Before the Court are: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Order granting Defendant Duro-Bilt's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Plaintiff on February 23,2007, 
including Defendant Duro-Bilt's objection and request for costs and fees related 
thereto, filed by Duro-Bilt on March 2,2007; 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Deem Goodman's Amended Renewed Objection to McKnights' 
ORDER - 1 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees and Objection to McKnights' Amended 
Memorandum of Costa and Attorney Fees and Objection to Duro-Bilt's Memorandum 
of Costs and Attorney Fees to be filed as of February 23,2007. 
3. Defendant McKnights' Amended Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, filed on 
February 7,2007; 
4. Defendant Duro-Bilt's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, filed on February 7, 
5. Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant McKnights' and 
Duro-Bilt's Memorandums for Costs and Attorney Fees, filed by Plaintiff on February 
23, 2007, and refiled as Amended Objections on March 20,2007, including 
Defendants' request for costs and fees related thereto, filed by Defendants on March 
2,2007; 
and, the Court having reviewed the relevant pleadings, briefs and memoranda, and having 
considered oral argument, and good cause appearing therefore: 
It is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied with costs and fees to be awarded to 
Defendant Duro-Bilt; 
a. Duro-Bilt shall file and serve an Affidavit showing costs and fees incurred in 
defending against Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration within ten (10) days 
of entry of this Order and any objections thereto shall be filed within fourteen 
(14) days of the filing and service of Duro-Bilt's Affidavit; 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Deem its Objections as filed as of February 23,2007, is manted. 
ORDER - 2 
3. Defendants' Motion to Strike is =anted with costs and fees to be awarded to 
Defendants; 
a. Defendants shall file and serve an Affidavit showing costs and fees incurred in 
prosecuting Defendants' Motion to Strike within ten (10) days of entry of this 
Order and any objections thereto shall be filed within fourteen (14) days of the 
filing and service of Defendants' Affidavit; 
4. Defendant McKnights' Amended Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees is manted 
under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l) in the 
amounts requested, including costs incurred by McKnights in defending against 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and, in preparing and presenting McKnights' 
Memorandums of Cost and Attorney Fees except that McKnights' discretionary costs 
are only awarded for photocopy costs; 
a. McKnights shall file and serve an Affidavit updating its Amended 
Memorandum showing costs and fees incurred in presenting their requests for 
costs and fees within ten (10) days of entry of this Order and any objections 
thereto shall be filed within fourteen (14) days of the filing and service of 
McKnights' Affidavit; 
5. Defendant Duro-Bilt's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees is manted under 
Idaho Code 5 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l) as follows: 
a. Defendant Duro-Bilt is awarded costs and attorney fees incurred by Duro-Bilt 
in defending against Plaintiffs Co~nplaint Counts Two, Three and Four and 
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and, in preparing and presenting Duro- 
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Bilt's Memorandum of Cost and Attorney Fees; 
b. Defendant Duro-Bilt is only awarded its photocopy costs as discretionary 
costs; 
c. Defendant Duro-Bilt shall file an amended Memorandum of Costs and Fees in 
accordance with this Order and any objections thereto shall be filed within 
fourteen (14) days of the filing and service thereof. 
6. Defendant Duro-Bilt's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees for costs and 
attorney fees incurred in preparing Duro-Bilt's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs Complaint Count One is denied. 
The Court's findings and conclusions were made on the record. A written transcript of the 
findings and conclusions is available at the request of either party. 
DATED this of April, 2007. 
By: 
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Email: jmsteele@,runfilaw.com 
)(__ U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
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___ Facsimile 
X U.S. Mail 
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MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE 
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